Hegel’s Account of the Presence of Space and Time in Sensation, Intuition, and the World: A Sellarsian View
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I. Introduction: Some Context

1. The subject of space, time, sensation, and intuition in Hegel is complicated, more so in Hegel than in Kant, and for good reason. Hegel rejected Kant’s Transcendental Idealism; besides the subjective reality Kant attributed to space and time, Hegel also attributed to them a truly objective reality. According to Hegel, space and time qualify finite things as they really are. Moreover, I shall argue, space and time, in Hegel’s view, have two different modes of subjective presence. We can illuminate these distinctive modes of subjective presence by comparing Hegel’s with Wilfrid Sellars’ strikingly similar arguments against Transcendental Idealism.

2. Tying space and time to the issues of sensation and intuition makes explicit my concern for both the phenomenology (in the post-1900 sense) and the epistemology of space and time, as well as their metaphysical status. That the phenomenology or presence in experience of space and time is a distinct issue from the epistemology of space and time is something I want to emphasize, for I fear that distinction is not always observed in the literature.

3. Let me set some context first. Hegel confronted a complex set of positions with
regard to space and time. Descartes’s identification of space and matter seems to have been put out of play, but still in play were

- the Newtonian conception that space and time are infinite objective (non-mind-dependent) entities in their own rights, independent of the objects that occupy them;

- the exoteric Leibnizian conception that space and time are derivative (but objective) existences, dependent on relations among independent objects, and incapable of existence without such independent objects\(^1\); and

- the Kantian conception that space and time are subjective forms of intuition that represent nothing with regard to things as they are in themselves, though they are objective and constitutive structures of the phenomenal reality within which humans are vouchsafed their lives.

These are recognizably the alternatives Kant puts on the table at A23/B37-8 in the Transcendental Aesthetic, though these positions do not exhaust the possibilities. For instance, according to one interpretation, Kant thought that Berkeley correctly took space to be subjective, but made the mistake of thinking that it was an attribute of empirical intuition (Janiak 2012). This helps explain why Berkeley thought we must face an extra explanatory burden with regard to the third dimension.

\(^{1}\)We now know that Leibniz’s esoteric doctrine, as opposed to his exoteric doctrine, taught that Space and time were *phenomena bene fundata.*
4. The general outline of Kant’s motivations for his position is fairly clear. The debate between Leibniz and Newton is a poser, but either one leaves a major problem: Kant believed that any view of space and time as objective leads to antinomies; whereas the subjectivity of space and time is a key move in resolving the antinomies. But it is also clear that the epistemology of space and time plays a central role in Kant’s final view: He needs to be able to account for the apriority of our knowledge of space (which he takes as having been made explicit in Euclidean geometry) and time (much less clearly associated in some way (perhaps?) with arithmetic). Kant’s view is, therefore, developed with an eye on both the metaphysics and the epistemology of space and time.

5. Kant’s solution is to distinguish between receptivity and spontaneity, intuition and conception, and then to treat space and time as the forms of human receptivity. Because space and time are both formal and dependent on the particularities of human nature, we can explain why our knowledge of them is apriori. Kant can thus treat space and time as Newtonianly absolute without substantivizing it. Kant thought his treatment of space and time was a new approach that resolved the standing problems he had inherited. The price for this was the acceptance of transcendental idealism and the rejection of the idea that we could ever know things as they are in themselves, a price Kant was eager to pay.
II. Hegel Contra Transcendental Idealism

6. When Hegel considers space and time, he begins his exposition with a bow to Kant’s treatment, but it is also clear that whatever truth is to be found in the Kantian view, transcendental idealism will not survive, for Hegel is convinced that transcendental idealism is just another name for subjective idealism, and that is anathema.

The nature of space has given rise to many theories. I shall only make mention of the Kantian determination of it as a form of sensuous intuition like time. It is now generally accepted that space must be regarded as a merely subjective element of the representative faculty. If we disregard the determinations of the Kantian Notion and subjective idealism in this theory, we are left with the correct determination of space as a simple form, i.e., an abstraction, the form of immediate externality. (EPN, §254 R; Petry I: 223)

Hegel’s rejection of Kant’s view, however, does not entail rejecting the Kantian doctrine that space and time are forms of intuition. Hegel grants the truth of that Kantian doctrine, but rejects the claim that they are only forms of intuition. Tied as it is to transcendental idealism, Hegel refuses to accept the fundamental dualism between the

\[\text{\footnotesize (EPN, §254 R; Petry I: 223)}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize (PN §254A; Theorie Werkausgabe, 9: 41-42)}\]
objective and the subjective that he attributes to Kant.³

Time, like space, is a pure form of sensibility or intuition; it is the insensible factor in sensibility. Like space however, time does not involve the difference between objectivity and a distinct subjective consciousness. If these determinations were to be applied to space and time, the first would be abstract objectivity, and the second abstract subjectivity. (PN, §258 R; Petry, I: 230)⁴

Space and time are, we might say, indifferent to the subject/object divide; they are forms of intuition, but also and equally forms of finite things, real things, not merely phenomenal things. The both/and solution is rejected by Kant for at least two reasons: it doesn’t seem compatible with his explanation of the apriority of our knowledge of space and time, and it would still engender the antinomies he thought his transcendental idealism resolves.

7. In Kantian terms, then, Hegel revives transcendental realism. Hegel is not bothered by the contradictions or antinomies that, according to Kant, follow on a transcendental realist treatment of space and time. Hegel welcomes and generalizes the idea that

³See Sally Segdwick (2012) for a nice discussion of Hegel’s rejection of transcendental idealism.

⁴Die Zeit ist wie der Raum eine reine Form der Sinnlichkeit oder des Anschauens, das unsinnliche Sinnliche, - aber wie diesen, so geht auch die Zeit der Unterschied der Objektivität und eines gegen dieselbe subjektiven Bewußtseins nichts an. Wenn diese Bestimmungen auf Raum und Zeit angewendet werden, so wäre jener die abstrakte Objektivität, diese aber die abstrakte Subjektivität. (PN §258A; Theorie Werkausgabe, 9: 48-49)
concepts generate antinomies; it is just such antinomies that generate higher or better concepts. For Kant, ‘dialectic’ is a bad thing, at best an exposure of falsehood, but not a path to truth; for Hegel, it is the lifeblood of the world and the only road to truth.

III. The Objective Reality of Space and Time

8. Hegel agrees with Kant that space and time are forms, but we have to be clear on what that means for Hegel. They are not forms in the sense of empty molds into which some material can be poured. That’s a version of a Newton’s substantivizing conception of space and time that Hegel rejects. For Hegel, space is an abstract, universal, ideal form, in particular, the abstract universality of self-externality (EPN §254). Time is the negativity, the self-sublation of the indifferent self-externality of space (EPN §§ 257-58). Matter and material objects are not prior existences that (somehow) come to inhabit space and time; space and time are the enabling conditions of material objects. To be a material object is to be located in space and time, to possess spatial and temporal characteristics. Yet, while Hegel thinks space and time are forms of natural things, he also thinks they are forms of our intuitive capacities. One challenge to his view, therefore, is to question how two such disparate contents could have the same form. After all, doesn’t Hegel insist that form and content (or form and matter) should be tuned to each other, each kind of content matched to its appropriate form and vice versa? Material, that is, finite and self-external objects in space and time
are the content of nature. But finite and self-external intentional objects are the content of intuition, so it is only to be expected that nature and intuition would share forms as well. Here the fact that space and time as forms are abstract is surely important. An abstract form, let’s say, the Sicilian Defense in chess, can be realized in any number of media: the traditional wood or plastic pieces moved on the traditional 8x8 board, pixels on a computer screen, written notation in a correspondence between the players, etc. Despite the material differences, there is a clear sense to the claim of sameness across these realizations.

9. What this reflection does call upon us to do, however, is to say what the matters are in which the abstract form of space and time are realized. I think it is valuable to distinguish in this regard between matter and content. I understand matter as it appears in the form/matter pair along Aristotelian lines, while content in the form/content pair as an essentially semantic concept, entwined with notions of meaning or significance. For instance, a feeling may be enmattered or embodied in a grimace or gesture, while its content is tied to its significance in the spiritual life of the subject. I believe Hegel observes this distinction, but I won’t argue that here. The material of experience is sensory; its content is spiritual. Space and time are the forms of finite, immediate self-externality. Space and time are the forms of material objects, which are finite, immediate, and self-external. In experience, when the content of spirit is self-external materiality, space and time recur as forms of the sensory manifold.
10. That space and time are abstract forms seems to be incompatible with any substantivalist interpretation of space and time themselves.

To ask whether space by itself is real, or whether it is only a property of things, is to ask one of the most well-worn of all metaphysical questions. If one says that it is something inherently substantial, then it must resemble a box, which, even if there is nothing in it, is still something subsisting within itself. Space is absolutely yielding and utterly devoid of opposition however; and if something is real, it is necessary that it should be incompatible with something else. (EPN, §254 Z; Petry, I: 225)

Time does not resemble a container in which everything is as it were borne away and swallowed up in the flow of a stream. Time is merely this abstraction of destroying. Things are in time because they are finite; they do not pass away because they are in time, but are themselves that which is temporal. Temporality is their objective determination. (EPN §258 Z; Petry, I: 231)

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5Eine Hauptfrage der Metaphysik war, ob der Raum für sich real sei oder nur eine Eigenschaft der Dinge. Sagt man, er ist etwas Substantielles für sich, so muß er wie ein Kasten sein, der, wenn auch nichts darin ist, sich doch als ein Besonderes für sich hält. Der Raum ist aber absolut weich, er leistet durchaus keinen Widerstand; von etwas Realem fordern wir aber, daß es unverträglich gegen Anderes sei. (PN §254Z; Theorie Werkausgabe, 9: 43)

6Die Zeit ist nicht gleichsam ein Behälter, worin alles wie in einen Strom gestellt ist, der fließt und von dem es fortgerissen und hinuntergerissen wird. Die Zeit ist nur diese Abstraktion des Verzehrens. Weil die Dinge endlich sind, darum sind sie in der Zeit; nicht weil sie in der Zeit sind, darum gehen sie unter, sondern die Dinge selbst sind das Zeitliche; so zu sein ist ihre objektive Bestimmung. (PN §258Z; Theorie Werkausgabe, 9: 43)
However, I do not want to try to develop an interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of space and time itself here; that would take us too far afield into Hegel’s relation to Newton and mechanical physics.

11. It is worth noting, however, that Hegel seems to take the truths of geometry to be conceptual truths that unpack assumptions made at the beginning of the inquiry, so he does not explain the apriority of mathematical knowledge by reference to the special role of intuition in the constitution of mathematics. It is the unfolding of a specific form of self-externality that applies universally to finite things. For instance, he argues explicitly in EPN §256R that the definition of a straight line as the shortest distance between two points, which Kant regarded as synthetic apriori, is analytic. The Zusatz asserts that

If certain determinations are given, it is the task of the science of geometry to discover what other determinations follow from them, the main thing being that that which is given, and that which follows, should constitute a single developed totality. The central propositions of geometry are those in which a whole is

Werkausgabe, 9: 50)

7“In so far as it is not a philosophical science, geometry may assume the universal determinations of space as its object, and it is not to be demanded of it that it should deduce the necessity of the three dimensions of space.” (PN §255R; Petry: I, 225, my emphasis). “Die Notwendigkeit, daß der Raum gerade drei Dimensionen hat, zu deduzieren, ist an die Geometrie nicht zu fordern, insofern sie nicht eine philosophische Wissenschaft ist und ihren Gegenstand, den Raum mit seinen allgemeinen Bestimmungen, voraussetzen darf” (PN §255A W???).
postulated, and expressed in its determinate elements. (EPN §256 Z; Petry: I, 228)

12. I want to move quickly beyond the treatment of (objective) space and time, because what most interests me is, indeed, their subjective presence in experience. What I find interesting about this part of Hegel’s thought is its complexity, a complexity that seems to me to be thoroughly justified by the facts. The complexity of Hegel’s treatment results from his distinguishing several different levels of sensibility and the corresponding requirement that space and time inform those levels in different ways.

IV. The Subjective Realities of Space and Time

13. Idealism and naturalism are usually taken to be at odds with each other, but however clear it is that Hegel is an idealist, it is equally clear that he is a naturalist in at least the following sense: He does not accept as fundamental any dualism that treats mind or spirit as a separable thing capable of existence independently of material nature. Indeed, he clearly treats mind/spirit as developing in seed, as it were, throughout the dialectical development of nature. There is, of course, a sense in which the Idea is prior to nature, but there is no less important a sense in which spirit develops from and within nature. So spirit develops in space and time. Neither geographical nor

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8Die Wissenschaft der Geometrie hat zu finden, welche Bestimmungen folgen, wenn gewisse andere vorausgesetzt sind; die Hauptsache ist dann, daß die vorausgesetzten und abhängigen eine entwickelte Totalität ausmachen. Die Hauptsätze der Geometrie sind die, wo ein Ganzes gesetzt ist und dieses in seinen Bestimmtheiten ausgedrückt ist. (PN§256Z; Theorie Werkausgabe, 9: 46)
historical characteristics are foreign to spirit, which, furthermore, also exists in the finite individuality of the human organism at very particular places and times. The symmetry that is significant for us is that while spirit is present in space and time, space and time are also present in spirit. They are present in ways as complex as the structure of spirit itself.

IV-A. Space and Time in Intuition

14. I am going to jump from space and time in nature to space and time in intuition. Hegel accepts the Kantian dictum that space and time are forms of intuition, but, arguably, he cannot mean just the same thing by this assertion, for Kant believed that space and time are only forms of intuition, that space and time could not also be properties or relations among things as they are independently of our cognitive faculties.

15. Intuition is the first subdivision of theoretical spirit. Thus, in intuition spirit adopts a generally passive attitude towards its objects, seeking to find itself, that is, to find reason in the object. At its lowest level, theoretical spirit is immediate and objective cognition, pervaded, however, with the (not yet fully explicit) certainty of and awareness of itself as spirit. It still appears to be self-external, like consciousness, related to something outside it that is merely given, that is to say, found. The dialectic of intuition is the overcoming of this appearance. Cf. §447z
16. So in more common language, what is really at issue? In Kant, it seems clear that ‘intuition’ (Anschauung) is pretty much equivalent to what English language speakers call ‘perception,’ by which, via uptake of their sensible qualities, we identify objects in space and time and acquire beliefs about them. Not all the properties and relations of perceptible objects are themselves perceptible. Hegel uses ‘Anschauung’ in a broader sense that need not be tied to specifically sensible qualities. Whenever we respond to a situation by immediately taking in a complex totality and being able to judge its truth, we are intuiring.

True intuition is full of spirit however, and apprehends the genuine substance of the general object. A talented historian for example, when describing circumstances and events, has before him a lively intuition of them as a whole, whereas a person with no talent for the presentation of history overlooks the substance of it and gets no further than the details. (PSS §449 Z; Petry, PSS, III: 139)

So we can say that, as in Kant, intuition involves the conceptual unification of a manifold—in the first instance a sensory manifold, and later, higher-level complex manifolds. What we do not yet thematize in intuition is the conceptual activity in the

\[\text{Geistvolle, wahrhafte Anschauung dagegen erfaßt die gediegene Substanz des Gegenstandes. Ein talentvoller Geschichtsschreiber z. B. hat das Ganze der von ihm zu schildernden Zustände und Begebenheiten in lebendiger Anschauung vor sich; wer dagegen kein Talent zur Darstellung der Geschichte besitzt, der bleibt bei Einzelheiten stehen und übersieht darüber das Substantielle.} \] (PSS §449Z; Theorie Werkausgabe, 10: 254)
mental act. Conceptualization is always present in intuition, and thus intuitions always operate in the logical space of reasons, but they appear to do so without the explicit mediation of reason or our rational capacities.

17. The three stages or ‘moments’ of intuition are (1) sensation or feeling, (2) attention, and (3) intuition proper. It is in the second moment, attention, that space and time enter the picture. We will come back to the issues in sensation and feeling, which also connect with earlier moments of the dialectics of nature and subjective spirit. The stage of attention has, itself, two moments, one of which is itself attention (properly so-called, we might say), in which, as I see it, some subset of the welter of sensory states found within a subjective spirit emerges as a focal point of the cognitive and cognitive/practical activity of spirit. This emergence within spirit of a specific focus is a necessary condition of the taking up (Auffassen) of an object. It yields a preliminary cognitive relation. It is not knowledge (Erkenntnis), says Hegel, but he does call it ‘Kenntnis’.¹⁰ I suggest we try to make sense of Hegel’s view here by thinking of

¹⁰My urge is to translate this as ‘acquaintance’ — this is probably the most natural translation. But among English-speaking philosophers ‘acquaintance’ has become closely tied to its use by Bertrand Russell as a technical term and its supposed role as the ultimate and certain foundation of our knowledge. That is not what Hegel has in mind here. Petry tries to evade this association in his translation by talking of ‘information,’ but that doesn’t seem quite right to me either. Wallace/Miller simply ignores the distinction between ‘Erkenntnis’ and ‘Kenntnis’, translating both as ‘knowledge,’ though adding in that ‘Kenntnis’ is “only superficial, not systematic.” Inwood contrasts “cognizance” to “cognition” to capture Hegel’s terminology (EPM §448Z).
intuitions as ‘takings as’. They are not apprehensions that purport to be of a mere ‘this’
as might be the case in sense certainty); they have conceptual content, which not only
provides internal unity to a manifold of sensory material, but also ties that manifold to
other manifolds via relations of sameness and difference, thus providing the universal
element.

18. The sensations/feelings that emerge as a focal point of spirit’s further cognitive
activity have, according to Hegel, the determination of being both objective and
subjective. It is subjective, for one thing, because the sensations are states of the subject,
describable as such in their own right, and for another, because attention is subject, if
only in part, to the will. But what one is paying attention to is not itself the attention;
there is an object of attention. In emerging within subjectivity as a locus of attention, the
sensations and feelings are distinguished from and made external to their own original
being. They become, therefore, self-external, which is made manifest by the adoption of
spatio-temporal form. The focus of attention must be determinately distinguished from
spirit, even if it is itself something internal to spirit.

What occurs on account of intuition is therefore simply the changing of the form of
internality into that of externality. . . . Two observations have to be made in respect
of the significance of this externality however; firstly, since what is spiritual or

11See EPM § 448, Z: ‘attention is something dependent on my willfulness (Willkür),
therefore, that I am only attentive when I will to be so’.
rational constitutes the objects’ own nature, what is sensed assumes the form of a self-externality in that it becomes an object external to the internality of spirit.

Secondly, we have to note that since this transformation of what is sensed proceeds from spirit as such, what is sensed is endowed with a spiritual, that is to say with an abstract externality, and so acquires the same universality as that which can pertain immediately to what is external, a universality which is still entirely formal and devoid of content. In this abstract externality however, the form of the Notion itself falls apart (cf. §§254-259). By means of intuition therefore, sensations are posited spatially and temporally. (PSS §448 Z; Petry PSS, III: 133)

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19. Intuition thus takes the sensory state to be something self-external—not necessarily external in the spatial sense, though obviously many sensory states are referred to points in space—but in the sense of not being mere expressions of spirit, even though, in

12Was somit durch die Anschauung zustandekommt, ist bloß die Umwandlung der Form der Innerlichkeit in die Form der Äußerlichkeit. . . . Über die Bedeutung jener Äußerlichkeit muß aber zweierlei bemerkt werden: erstens, daß das Empfundene, indem es zu einem der Innerlichkeit des Geistes äußerlichem Objekte wird, die Form eines Sich-selber-Äußerlichen erhält, da das Geistige oder Vernünftige die eigene Natur der Gegenstände ausmacht. Fürs zweite haben wir zu bemerken, daß, da jene Umgestaltung des Empfundenen vom Geiste als solchem ausgeht, das Empfundene dadurch eine geistige, d. h. eine abstrakte Äußerlichkeit und durch dieselbe diejenige Allgemeinheit bekommt, welche dem Äußerlichen unmittelbar zuteil werden kann, nämlich eine noch ganz formelle, inhaltslose Allgemeinheit. Die Form des Begriffs fällt aber in dieser abstrakten Äußerlichkeit selber auseinander. Die letztere hat daher die doppelte Form des Raumes und der Zeit. (Vgl. § 254 -259) Die Empfindungen werden also durch die Anschauung räumlich und zeitlich gesetzt. (PSS §448Z; Theorie Werkausgabe, 10: 252)
a different sense, that is what they are. Even mental states are formally self-external in
being temporal, not wholly themselves in any moment. To reiterate a point already made:

If we have said that what is sensed derives the form of what is spatial and
temporal from the *intuiting spirit* however, this statement must not be taken to
mean that space and time are *only subjective* forms, which is what *Kant* wanted to
make of them. The truth is that the things in *themselves* are spatial and temporal,
this dual form of extrinsicality not being onesidedly imparted to them by our
intuition, but in origin already communicated to them by the implicit, infinite
spirit, by the eternally creative Idea. Our intuiting spirit therefore bestows upon
the determinations of sensation the honour of endowing them with the abstract
form of space and time and so assimilating as well as making proper general
objects of them. (PSS §448 Z; Petry, PSS, III: 135)

20. It is time now to worry about what exactly this projection of sensation into space

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13Wenn wir aber gesagt haben, daß das Empfundene vom *anschauenden Geiste* die
Form des Räumlichen und Zeitlichen erhalte, so darf dieser Satz nicht so verstanden
werden, als ob Raum und Zeit nur *subjektive* Formen seien. Zu solchen hat *Kant* den
Raum und die Zeit machen wollen. Die Dinge sind jedoch in Wahrheit *selber* räumlich
und zeitlich; jene doppelte Form des Außereinander wird ihnen nicht einseitigerweise
von unserer Anschauung angetan, sondern ist ihnen von dem an sich seienenden
unendlichen Geiste, von der schöpferischen ewigen Idee schon ursprünglich
angeschaffen. Indem daher unser anschauender Geist den Bestimmungen der
Empfindung die Ehre erweist, ihnen die abstrakte Form des Raumes und der Zeit zu
gaben und sie dadurch ebensoweiter zu eigentlichen Gegenständen zu machen wie
dieselben sich zu assimilieren. . . . (PSS §448Z; Theorie Werkausgabe, 10: 253)
Hegel warns us that space and time are extremely primitive and superficial determinations, forms, therefore, which are of very little significance to things, and through the forfeiting of which, if this were in any way possible, they would therefore lose very little. Cognitive thinking does not halt at these forms, but apprehends things in their Notion, which contains space and time as sublated within it. (Ibid.)

This is not hard to make sense of: if one knows only the spatio-temporal properties of things, their where and when, but nothing else, one knows very little indeed. Absent knowledge of something’s sensible qualities, its causal, teleological, and social properties, one has only the barest grasp of a thing, a something there and then. Yet the sensible, causal, teleological, and social properties of things absolutely require a spatio-temporal locus and cannot be described without reference to space and time.

However ‘primitive and superficial’ space and time might be as determinations of things, we cannot be so dismissive when it comes to our cognition of them. It is difficult to dismiss geometry as “primitive and superficial”— it was an admittedly early but still glorious achievement of the human spirit. It was only after Hegel’s career that the development of non-Euclidean geometries became known and it could no longer be

\[\text{daß Raum und Zeit höchst dürftige und oberflächliche Bestimmungen sind, daß daher die Dinge an diesen Formen sehr wenig haben, also auch durch deren Verlust, wäre dieser anders möglich, sehr wenig verloren. Das erkenntende Denken hält sich bei jenen Formen nicht auf; es erfaßt die Dinge in ihrem den Raum und die Zeit als ein Aufgehobenes in sich enthaltenden Begriffe. (PSS §448Z; Theorie Werkausgabe, 10: 253)}\]
taken for granted that Euclid’s geometry described physical space. Today, the question of the fundamental nature of space and time is clearly recognized to be difficult and still open as physics develops.

22. Hegel’s claims concerning space, time, and our cognition of them allow the accommodation of these modern developments, I believe, for he tells us that space and time are abstract forms, and abstract forms themselves can be organized in genera and species. The subjective space and time into which objects of intuition are projected might be in some perfectly reasonable sense the same form as the objective physical space inhabited by things, even if there are specific differences between them. But we cannot leave it at that, for there are puzzles that arise as we think these things through. Intuition has conceptual content: what we can intuit depends on the concepts we can bring to bear upon the sensory manifold. Our conception of space and time has undergone significant change in the past 400 years; if we externalize the sensory manifold in intuition, referring (to use Kant’s locution) the sensory to spatio-temporal locations and relations, do the changes in our conceptions of space and time somehow appear in our intuitive experience itself? It is implausible to claim that experienced space changes as our conception of space changes. Our conception of space and time is open to indefinitely great refinement and specification under the influence of increasingly sophisticated empirical investigation of physical nature, but our experience of space and time is going to be limited by the structure of our sensory capacities, whatever
conceptions we have available to synthesize sensory input.

23. Here, I think some ideas Wilfrid Sellars developed in his treatment of Kant can help us see how to resolve some of these puzzles. Sellars suggests that Kant’s notion of intuition harbors confusions because Kant did not develop ‘the idea of the manifold of sense as characterized by analogical counterparts of the perceptible qualities and relations of physical things and events’ (Sellars 1967, Ch. I, ¶78: 30). The idea of counterpart qualities and relations helps us understand how the same form could be found in both nature and the experiences of subjective spirits. What might be more important in the long run is that it also helps us understand that we can represent space and time both sensorily and conceptually. For most of human history, these were assumed to go together: the space presented to us immediately in experience is the same space that we conceptualize in our thoughts and theories. But, we now see that the sameness here need only be formal and abstract. The sensory representation of space and time may be the occasion of our original conception of space and time, but under the pressure of both empirical and conceptual sophistication, our final and adequate conception of space and time might have only a generic similarity to its sensory counterpart.

24. We could put this in a different perspective: Kant treats our concepts of space and time as if they are simply derived from–given by–our sensory capacities, a kind of
Sellars points out that our conception of space and time is no more a simple given, fixed once and for all by something non-conceptual, than is any other concept of ours. We do begin to develop our concepts of space and time based on the structural organization of the sensory manifold as captured in our initial and rudimentary concepts. But every concept, as such, is open to dialectical refinement, so there is no reason to believe that the best description of the structural organization of the sensory manifold itself will turn out to be specifically identical with the best description of the structural organization of nature, even if we can count on their generic sameness.

25. Thus, on this interpretation, intuition produces states in which we grasp the unity of complex manifolds immediately. In the first instance, these manifolds are sensuous manifolds, but the educated or gebildete human can grasp complex, many-layered manifolds. Intuitions are, therefore, an exercise of our conceptual or rational capacities, but it is not, of course the end of the story. Hegel admonishes us that

Mere intuition has to be superseded however, the necessity of this lying in intelligence conforming with its Notion as cognition. Intuition, however, is not yet cognitive knowledge, since as such it has not yet attained to the immanent development of the substance of the general object, but rather confines itself to apprehending the unexplicated substance, which is still enclosed within the

\(^{15}\)See (Redding 2007).
secondary essentiality of what is external and contingent. Intuition is therefore only
the initiation of cognition. (PSS, §449 Z; Petry PSS, III: 140-41)\textsuperscript{16}

The apparent immediacy of intuition is possible only within a context in which the
implicit activity of recollection and conceptualization has become explicit in
representation and thought.

IV-B. Space and Time in Sensation and Feeling

26. That was a quick handwave to the culmination of intuition. But surely the reader
has noticed that the interpretation of intuition I proposed presupposes that Hegel has a
robust conception of sensation and sensory states. So I now want to make that case.
The first thing to notice, of course, is that in order to understand Hegel’s conception of
sensibility, we cannot confine ourselves to the philosophy of spirit: Sensibility is a
function (indeed, the distinguishing feature) of the animal organism and receives
extensive treatment in the philosophy of nature.

In the animal the self is for the self, and the immediate consequence of this is that
the differentia specifica or absolute distinguishing feature of the animal, is the
completely universal element of its subjectivity, the determination of sensation.

\textsuperscript{16}Daß aber aus der bloßen Anschauung herausgetreten werden muß, davon liegt
die Notwendigkeit darin, daß die Intelligenz ihrem Begriffe nach Erkennen, die
Anschauung dagegen noch nicht erkennendes Wissen ist, weil sie \textit{als solche} nicht zur
immanenten Entwicklung der Substanz des Gegenstandes gelangt, sondern sich vielmehr
auf das Erfassen der noch mit dem \textit{Beiwesen} des Äußerlichen und Zufälligen umgebenen,
\textit{unentfalteten} Substanz beschränkt. Die Anschauung ist daher nur der \textit{Beginn} des
Erkennens. (PSS §449Z; Theorie Werkausgabe, 10: 255)
The second thing to notice is that whereas Kant has been the background against which we’ve understood Hegel’s text so far, it is Aristotle who most significantly informs Hegel’s thought about sensation—especially the idea that there is an identity of form shared between the sensation and the object sensed.

27. Hegel’s attempt to explain the very nature of sensation is fascinating but obscure. I discussed it at some length in Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity and, unfortunately, I have no new insights to add: There are certain determinations of the animal organism that manage to be present in the animal simultaneously as generic and as specific, by which means those determinations are not only present in the animal, but to the animal as well. These determinations are tied to certain organs, the sense organs and nerve fibers of the animal.

28. However fascinating Hegel’s attempt to explain the nature of sentience, my focus here is on the presence of space and time in our experience. The point I want to make now is that although Hegel ‘officially’ introduces space and time into subjective spirit only at the level of intuition, space and time clearly must be present in more primitive

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\text{Darin, daß beim Tiere das Selbst für das Selbst ist, liegt sogleich, als das ganz Allgemeine der Subjektivität, die Bestimmung der Empfindung, welche die differentia specifica, das absolut Auszeichnende des Tiers ist. (PN §351Z; Thieorie Werkausgabe, 9: 432)}\]
levels of experience. It is not difficult to see why. Animals orient themselves in a
spatio-temporal environment; they find food, shelter, and mates, often evade predators,
and they have some sense of the boundaries between themselves and the world around
them. All of this involves their sensory interaction with the world. Higher animals
must, therefore, have at least a sense of where they are and where the things they need
are, and they can figure out trajectories between moving objects, whereby time enters
their ‘calculations’.

29. The dialectic tends to move from the less to the more determinate, and this must be
the case with regard to the presence of space and time in experience. In intuition
humans confront the world via a determinate, even if abstract, form of sensibility, one
that enables them to measure space and time and recognize in them the highly
determinate forms of geometry and chronometry. The forms in which space and time
are available to animals, we have to think, are less determinate: near and far, big and
small, just happened and sometime back, mere directionality — these are the kinds of
relations available to an animal. They are tied closely to the practical process of
irritability.

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18 This point is connected in complex ways to the distinction I made in ¶2 above
between the phenomenology and the epistemology of space and time. Space and time
seem to be phenomenologically present to higher animals, arguably in ways not unlike
its phenomenological presence in human experience, although ultimately this is an
empirical question. But the epistemology will have some significant differences.
30. I proposed earlier that Sellars’s suggestion that our sensory states exhibit counterpart properties and relations that enable them to be proxies for objects, properties, and events in our environment can help us understand how it is that space and time can be present both in the world and in our experience. The various sensory systems of the animal contribute to an ideal counterpart construction (in the common sense) of it in its environment.

The animal organism is the microcosm, the centre of nature which has become for itself. Within it, the whole of inorganic nature has recapitulated itself and is idealized. . . . (PN §352 Z; Petry PN, III: 108)

These counterparts are present in both animal and human, and their peculiarities can account for the shape of differing phenomenologies in organisms with differing sensory structures (e.g., the infamous worry about what it’s like to be a bat) or sensory disabilities. What distinguishes human intuition from animal sensation and irritability is precisely the presence in intuition of conceptual structure, the presence of abstract structure as such for the organism, which enables human intuition to “apprehend the genuine substance” of its objects.

31. But this then brings us to an important question in the interpretation of this text: How do space and time figure into the Encyclopaedia Phenomenology? Hegel says

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19Der tierische Organismus ist der Mikrokosmos, das für sich gewordene Zentrum der Natur, worin sich die ganze unorganische Natur zusammengefaßt hat und idealisiert ist. . . . (PN §352Z, Theorie Werkausgabe: 435)
In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* . . . I have determined the general object of sensuous consciousness as spatial and temporal singularity, *here* and *now*. Strictly speaking this belongs to intuition. At this juncture the object is to be taken, in the first instance, only in accordance with the relationship it has with consciousness, that is to say, as *external* to it. It is not yet to be determined as in itself external or as being self-external. (PSS §418; Petry, PSS, III: 21)

This seems to demand a significant revision of at least the ‘Sense Certainty’ chapter, and it’s hard to see how to make sense of ‘Perception’ and ‘Understanding’ without reference to space and time.

32. But Hegel drops the important hint in the passage I just quoted. What is present to consciousness in the Phenomenology is an object that is conceived of as *external*, but not yet *self-external*. What is the difference? For one thing, an object that is external but not self-external is an object that is self-contained, complete in itself, different from and independent of the subject. The subject-object distinction is taken to be absolute here, so absolute that either one, subject or object, is supposed to be entirely separable from the other. The Encyclopaedia Phenomenology is the story of the overcoming or sublation of

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this supposedly absolute distinction. Only once this distinction is overcome, does it become clear that the objects we relate to cognitively are not only external but self-external—that is, not self-contained and determinate entirely in their right, but essentially bound up in contexts, situations, and relations to other objects and to the subjects that cognize them. Only then are they suited to be posited in space and time, the forms of self-externality.

33. In a more Kantian mode, one might think of it like this: Kant took there to be two basic determinants of the objects of knowledge: sensible form and categorial form. These are independent of each other, but both are simple givens as far as we are concerned. The forms of sensibility are determined by the contingencies that make human beings what they are, whereas categorial form is determined by the universal nature of judgement. For Hegel, however, these forms are neither fully independent of each other nor simple givens. Springing from a common root, subject and object, sensible and conceptual form are mutually dependent. In the subject/object dialectic, therefore, there can be stages at which the object is distinguished from the subject and therefore external to it, without that object yet being conceived of as determinately self-external and enmeshed in a metric space and time. The logic of objecthood in general is distinguishable from the more determinate logic of spatio-temporal objecthood; a transcendental deduction does not depend on the specific details of a metric space and time. Objects in their full generality are immediacies that unify abstract and general
properties in particular ways and are both distinguishable from each other while necessarily connected via robust subjunctives. Spatio-temporality is a specific form of objects. The Encyclopaedia Phenomenology is the dialectic of objecthood in general.

34. Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit has long been an unjustly neglected part of Hegel’s system. This regrettable situation is beginning to change. There is a wealth of interesting material in this text that I haven’t discussed here, e.g., the distinction between sensation and feeling, but . . . Rome wasn’t built in a day. I leave you with the thought that Hegel made significant strides towards an understanding of the mind over the work of his predecessors at the very least because he took our continuity with other biological entities seriously. Of course, this immediately rules out Cartesian dualism. More significantly, it paves the way to requiring evidence for any claimed distinction between humans and animals. Of course, Hegel lived before Darwin finally gave us the framework that finally put us on the proper path to understanding our relationship to the animal kingdom. But what I’ve called Hegel’s naturalistic ‘moment’ is the source of a great deal of the richness in Hegel’s treatment of spirit. Whatever one’s attitude towards naturalism might ultimately be, this is a lesson one should not forget.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{21}}\text{For instance, (Stern 2012). And, of course, this volume.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{22}\text{An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Bonn Summer School on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. My thanks to Markus Gabriel. The editors of this volume, Susanne Herrmann-Sinai and Lucia Ziglioli gave me very helpful comments as well.}}\]
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