

CHAPTER 4

Sense-certainty and the “this-such”

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Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* is knowledge’s voyage of self-discovery. It begins with the mere appearance of knowledge – that is, what knowledge at first *seems* to be. But what knowledge at first seems to be is not congruent with its reality, even in its first appearance.¹ The incongruence creates an instability that pushes knowledge on to other ways to take itself, stopping only when a conception of knowledge has been developed on which knowledge seems to be exactly what it is. My concern here is an examination of one of the opening arguments in the “sense-Certainty” chapter of the *Phenomenology*, showing how the moves Hegel tracks in the “sense-Certainty” chapter provide an important supplement to the analysis of perceptual knowledge provided by Wilfrid Sellars (1967).

I

To begin the story of knowledge’s self-discovery, we need to be able to fix the beginning point: How does knowledge first appear? Hegel’s answer assumes – an assumption to be justified in the course of his story – that knowledge is some form of relatedness between mind and world, and then asserts that knowledge first appears as an *immediate and simple relation* between mind and world. Given the direction of fit implicit in our pretheoretic concept of knowledge, this seems to require that the object must be simply what is and the subject must be receptive, the knowledge neither transforming the object nor adding anything new or additional. Immediacy, simplicity, and receptivity are familiar themes in classical attempts to grasp the most basic cognitive confrontation between mind and world, and Hegel invites us to be fellow travelers along a path that

¹ The “at first” here is not *temporal*; the *Phenomenology* is not a history, but a kind of rational reconstruction, though one that is far more conscious of the dynamic nature of the conceptual than most. The “at first” means *in its simplest construal*.

starts with the naïvest of conceptions of knowledge and reconstructs both metaphysics and epistemology from the ground up.

How are we, then, to understand our most immediate and most basic cognitive confrontation with the world? That there is (must be?) some point at which mind and world stand in most immediate contact, where the relation between them, even if not simple, is at least at its most direct or immediate, seems unavoidable. Today, in the wake of Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, we recognize the need to distinguish between causal immediacy and epistemic immediacy, and to recognize that the two need not go hand-in-hand. Too often, the point of immediate *causal* contact has also been taken to be the point of immediate *epistemic* contact and, not only that, but to provide a *firm foundation* on which a hierarchical structure of further knowledge rests. This notion of a hierarchical structure of knowledge built on a firm foundation is not entailed by the notion of a point of most immediate contact between mind and world, however and, interestingly, Hegel never bothers to address this popular contention directly. The naïve conception of knowledge with which we begin the *Phenomenology* does not even have this level of sophistication.

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A noticeable peculiarity of Hegel's "sense-Certainty" chapter in the *Phenomenology* is Hegel's emphasis on the word "this" and other indexical terms, such as "I," "here," and "now." Metaphysical or epistemological arguments that rely so explicitly and heavily on a distinctively *linguistic* form like indexical reference are not common among early modern philosophers. Concern with language at that level of detail is unusual before the development of modern logic and linguistics. It is not surprising that such arguments put one in mind of Bertrand Russell and his treatment of indexicals a hundred years after the *Phenomenology* appeared.² Interestingly, although arguments based on linguistic forms are rampant in analytic philosophy, analytic philosophers have not been fond of the opening chapter of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. When they have paid it attention, too often they have misunderstood it completely.³ It took over half a century

² See, for instance, Bertrand Russell's argument that one can name only what one is acquainted with and therefore only indexicals are names in the "proper strict logical sense of word" Russell (1956 see), 200–202.

³ I address one such clear misinterpretation shared by D. W. Hamlyn, Ivan Soll, and others in deVries (1988a). See also Hamlyn (1961), 140–146; Soll (1969), 91–110; Plumer (1980), 71–94; Inwood (1983), 311–317.

before analytic philosophy began to make sense of the chapter.⁴ Now that analysts no longer just assume that Hegel is up to no good, we have begun not only to take Hegel's arguments seriously, but also to look for ways in which his interpretations can enrich our understanding of other philosophers.

Hegel's discussion of "this" in "Sense-Certainty" recalls not only Russell or Kaplan⁵ but, perhaps more fittingly, Sellars' discussion in *Science and Metaphysics* (1967) of Kant's conception of intuition. Putting Hegel into dialog with Kant and Sellars is, to many, very probably, a scary prospect. All three are notoriously difficult, so there is a risk of explaining *obscurum per obscurius*, but all three are also philosophers of profound insight. The potential reward outweighs the risk.

3

Let me first draw the connection to Sellars, for it is present right on the surface, though it remains to be seen how deep it really goes. As the Sellars connection becomes clear, the Kant connection will follow. In the opening chapter of *Science and Metaphysics*, titled "Sensibility and Understanding," Sellars examines Kant's views on the nature and the relation of those two faculties. In particular, Sellars suggests using linguistic expressions of the form "this-such" to model Kant's conception of intuition. Sellars' motives for proposing this model, and the lesson he wants readers to draw from it, provide a useful beginning point.

The distinction between sensibility and understanding is vital to Kant. It is almost overwhelmingly tempting to treat Kant's distinction between the representations of the understanding and the representations of sensibility as a distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual representations.⁶ And there is, Sellars admits, *something* to this interpretation: Intuition is often contrasted by Kant to conception. But, Sellars claims, even Kant himself was not entirely clear about the distinctions towards which he was struggling. According to Sellars, Kant's primary notion of a concept is of something *general*, something that is a predicate of a possible judgment,⁷ capable of subsuming a manifold of intuitions. There remains room to think of intuitions, a class nominally contrasted to concepts, as still

⁴ Among the early positive interpretations of these parts of the *Phenomenology* are Bernstein (1971) and Taylor (1972).

⁵ Kaplan (1979, 1989). ⁶ Sellars (1967), §4: 2. ⁷ Kant (*CPR*), A69/B94.

conceptual in a broader sense, namely as a class of conceptual items aimed at the *individual* rather than the general as such.

From Sellars' point of view, this is a very important point, because describing something as "conceptual" in this broader sense is a placing of it in the logical space of reasons. In this broad sense, conceptual items are all things – representations – that are subject to standards of correctness. Conceptual states, but not non-conceptual states, can be *right* or *wrong*; they are things we may be called upon to justify, and (most important in the case of intuitions) things that can justify other representations; they are inferentially potent. In this sense, then, it is absolutely crucial that intuitions be conceptual, that it is germane to raise questions about the correctness of an intuition or of its rational consequences for other representations.

It is no less important to Hegel that not all conceptuality is purely *general*. For we can see in the idea that there is a kind of conceptuality that is, as such, aimed at the individual rather than the general the core notion of Hegel's conception of the concrete universal.

Sellars' suggestion certainly reflects some important themes in Kant's treatment of intuition.⁸ Kant is pretty clear that intuitions are representations of *individuals*, and therefore are not general. But, of course, being a conceptual representation of an individual is not a sufficient condition for being an intuition. It is possible to represent a unique individual by means of thoroughly general concepts, and this is reflected in the structure of some singular referential devices, such as the definite description:

A plausible suggestion is that "intuitions" differ from other conceptual representations of individuals by not being mediated by general concepts in the way in which, for example, "the individual which is perfectly round" is mediated by the general concept of being perfectly round.⁹

This negative characterization of intuition is complemented by Kant's positive assertion that intuitive representations relate *immediately* to their objects. There are, of course, a variety of ways to understand such immediacy, but Sellars thinks we need not, at this point, choose among them. He proposes construing intuitions on the model of the demonstrative "this," which contrasts with the definite article "the" in its logic and especially in the implication of immediate presence it carries. We need not have in hand

⁸ In discussing intuitions, Kant most frequently emphasizes that they are products of receptivity and stand in immediate relation to their object, but he also says that intuitions are "single" (*CPR*, A320/B377). The immediate relation an intuition bears to its object is to its particular object itself, as an individual, not as possessing some "mark" also shared by other objects.

⁹ Sellars (1967), §7: 3.

an exhaustive theory of demonstratives in order to be able to use them as a model, for demonstratives are a familiar kind of linguistic term the functioning of which we understand generally quite well, even if not completely and explicitly. In the linguistic function of singular demonstrative terms, we recognize an expression of one’s immediate relation to a singular object:

On this model, which I take to be, on the whole, the correct interpretation, intuitions would be representations of *thises* and would be conceptual in that peculiar way in which to represent something as a *this* is conceptual.¹⁰

Sellars does not here pause to tell us what the peculiar way is in which representing something as a *this* is conceptual. That is an important fact for my story here.

But Sellars does not rest with the idea that intuitions are representations of *thises*. Other considerations in Kant push him to complicate his model of intuitions significantly. An intuition is not just a representation of a *this*, it is a representation of a *this-such*. Typically, Sellars does not pause to discuss the importance of this supplementation of the model, but it is not trivial. “*This*” is a transcendental term, in the medieval sense, in that it ranges across categories – anything and everything can be a *this*, if one is only clever enough in establishing the speech context. Being a *this*, or representing a *this*, tells us *nothing* about the relevant object. The pure *this* tells us only that whatever the object is, it is something with which one stands somehow or other in immediate relation. A *this-such*, however, is not a bare *this*: It has a predicative qualification built into it and locates the object within some classificatory scheme. A *this-such* is obviously conceptual in a way that a pure *this* may not be, for the “such” takes as substituends the kinds of terms we readily see to express concepts (e.g. this *cube*, this *man*, even this *thing*). If Kantian intuitions are not representations of mere *thises*, but representations of *this-suches*, then it is obvious that they are conceptual episodes, even if they may also contain (in some sense) a non-conceptual content as well.

What considerations motivate Sellars to enrich his proposed model of Kantian intuitions? His appeal is to the fact that, according to Kant, at least some intuitions involve synthesis. Kant provides the material for a distinction between intuitions that do and intuitions that do not involve anything over and above sheer receptivity. Furthermore, Kant also tells us that it is intuitions that involve synthesis which the understanding subsumes under general concepts.¹¹ Since “the same function which gives

¹⁰ Sellars (1967), §7: 3. ¹¹ Kant (*CPR*), A78/B104.

unity to the various representations *in a judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*¹² (which function Kant calls the “productive imagination”), it makes sense to think of the synthesis of an intuition as a unifying of a manifold under what we can think of as an *individual concept*, a *this-such*:

For of intuitions those, at least, which are synthesized by the productive imagination would seem to have a form illustrated by “this-cube,” which, though not a judgment, is obviously closely connected with the judgment “This is a cube.”¹³

Intuitions that are not synthesized by the productive imagination are mere sensations, the manifold of intuition, not yet combined into an intuition of a manifold. Sellars thinks Kant was not perfectly clear about the need to distinguish sensation from intuition proper.¹⁴ Insisting on that distinction is one of the ways that Sellars hopes to improve on, or clean up, Kant’s philosophy.

What is important here, however, is the fact that the motivation Sellars gives for extending the model of intuition from a simple “this” to the more complex “this-such” is quite internal to Kant’s own system. Someone who accepted the idea that the immediacy of intuition can be captured by modeling intuition with demonstratives but was not inclined to accept the other parts of Kant’s system (in particular Kant’s difficult notion of synthesis), would have no reason to accept the richer model of intuition that Sellars proposes. Thinking of our immediate cognitive contact with the world as best expressed in a pure “this” remains on the table and, with it, the idea that our immediate cognitive contact with the world is non- or pre-conceptual. Here is where it is significant that Sellars gives us no story about “that peculiar way in which to represent something as a *this* is conceptual.”¹⁵

In section 4 I argue that in the “sense-Certainty” chapter of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel gives us an argument to show that we cannot avoid the *this-such*. Every *this* is, in fact, already (if only implicitly) a *this-such*. And thus every *this* is conceptual in a fairly straightforward way. We do not need to establish some special form of conceptuality reserved for *thises* – although that, too, could be done. Since there is a great deal of plausibility to the idea that our most immediate cognitive contact with objects in the world is expressed in (or modeled by) demonstrative phrases, our most immediate cognitive contact with objects in the world is conceptual.

¹² Kant (*CPR*), A79/B104–105. ¹³ Sellars (1967), §11: 5. ¹⁴ See Sellars (1967), §18: 7.

¹⁵ Sellars (1967), §7: 3.

4

Our central question is: How are we to understand our most immediate and basic cognitive confrontation with the world? Hegel thinks that this question about immediate knowledge is a natural beginning point for the general inquiry into knowledge:

The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply *is*. (63, ¶90)

A seeming peculiarity of Hegel’s methodology is that as a *beginning* point for the inquiry into knowledge, sense-certainty is not apparently *chosen* from among competing alternative views of knowledge by someone who already has a complex, self-aware conception of knowledge and its kinds. The inquiry into knowing seems to begin where many think all knowledge begins, i.e. at the immediate presence of the world to mind, accepted at face value, or rather apotheosized into the ideal of knowledge. At the beginning of the inquiry into knowledge, there is no sophistication about knowledge, no distinctions internal to the view of knowledge adopted. The immediate presence of world to mind exhausts the concept of knowledge available at this point. Thus, immediate knowledge is thought of not as an element in a complex structure of knowledge, but as the very essence, indeed the exhaustive essence, of knowledge. Knowledge at its best – true knowledge – *is* immediate knowledge.¹⁶ Furthermore, because the cognitive relatedness in sense-certainty is supposed to be pure immediacy, sense-certainty must be a relatedness between *individuals*. Relations to universals or among universals cannot have the requisite immediacy (for relations to or among universals are always mediated by relations to or among the particulars that realize the universals).

Hegel expresses the elements of this simple and immediate conception of knowledge as simple and immediate by the use of indexicals, e.g. “this” and “I.” Or rather, since Hegel would deny that he is foisting on sense-certainty

¹⁶ “I, *this* particular I, am certain of *this* particular thing, not because I, *qua* consciousness, in knowing it have developed myself or thought about it in various ways; and also not because *the thing* of which I am certain, in virtue of a host of distinct qualities, would be in its own self a rich complex of connections, or related in various ways to other things. Neither of these has anything to do with the truth of sense-certainty: here neither I nor the thing has the significance of a complex process of mediation; the “I” does not have the significance of a manifold imagining or thinking; nor does the “thing” signify something that has a host of qualities . . . Similarly, certainty as a *connection* is an *immediate* pure connection: consciousness is “I,” nothing more, a pure “This”; the singular consciousness knows a pure “This,” or a single item” (63, ¶91).

an expressive form it would not take as its own, we should better say that the expressive form most suited to capturing sense-certainty's meaning is the indexical. Singular indexicals also express the individuality of the elements in sense-certainty.

But, despite the intention to express individuality and immediacy via the use of the indexicals, *our* reflection as readers of the *Phenomenology* and consciousness's own experience both reveal that, whatever it takes its elements to be, sense-certainty cannot grasp the immediate and individual *as such*. It can grasp only something universal.¹⁷ What sense-certainty *means* to express is not what it, in fact, expresses. For, Hegel argues, it turns out that "this" and "I" do not express immediate individuality; they turn out to be universals in their own right, intrinsically mediated by relations to numerous otherwise disparate individuals.

Hegel's argument for the universality of such indexicals is not a straightforward affair. He asks "*What is the This?*" and immediately distinguishes two forms of "this," namely "here" and "now." By what right does he make this distinction? It is common and familiar enough, but doesn't his dialectic purport to be more rigorous than that? I think Hegel does indeed discharge this burden a bit later in the argument (68, ¶107 f.) by arguing that it is indeed *necessary* that the "this" have distinguishable moments, that "this" makes sense only in the context of a system of classificatory predicates. That is the argument towards which we are heading, for in the context I provide here, it can be seen as an argument that a "this" *must* be a "this-such" and never a *pure* "this." But the understanding of the "this" elaborated in the sense-Certainty chapter grows stage-wise, and we are not yet ready for that argument.

Hegel here (64, ¶95) asks: "*What is Now?*" and answers: "*Now is not.*" These two questions: "*What is the This?*" and "*What is Now?*," are treated superficially as genus and species, but that appearance is deceptive. The actual relation seems to be that of meta- and object-level questions. The question about the *this* is surely not a question about what is before the author or the reader of the *Phenomenology*, but a question about what the particular significance or burden of "this"-representations is – a meta-representational question. The question about the now, as treated here, is a different kind of question given a straightforward object-level answer: now is night.

Hegel proposes a "simple experiment" to test whether this sense-certainty, now is night, is *true*. "We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose anything

¹⁷ For *our* realization of this, see 64, ¶92. For consciousness's experience of it, see 64, ¶¶93–99.

by being written down, any more than it can lose anything through our preserving it" (64, ¶95). But if Hegel means by "truth" the semantic property that qualifies (among other things) those sentences that correctly describe the empirical world, it is most certainly the case that writing a sentence down can destroy its truth. If I *say* "I am speaking out loud," what I say is true and pragmatically self-supporting; if I write it down, the sentence is then false or at best accidentally true, because I just "happen" to be saying something at the time. Hegel's notion of truth, of course, is notoriously *not* the same as the semantic property of those sentences that correctly describe the empirical world – *that* property he calls "correctness." At the very least, what Hegel means by "truth" has to be something enduring. Hegel describes it as something that *is*. "The Now that is *not*" is *preserved*, i.e. it is treated as what it professes to be, as something that *is*; but it proves itself to be, on the contrary, something that is *not* (65, ¶96).

Why what *is* could not be evanescent – why preservability or durability is a good test of truth and being – is simply not argued here. Hegel has arguments elsewhere concerning such things, but here it is treated as an assumption common to both the "natural consciousness" with which the *Phenomenology* begins and the philosophical consciousness that observes it.

Though the now that is night is not preserved, *is* not, the *now* itself *is* preserved, but not as night, for it is now day. The now itself, therefore, meets the standard for being, namely, permanence and self-preservation, but only as a "negative in general." Neither day nor night *is* the now:

A simple thing of this kind which *is* through negation, which is neither This nor That, a *not-This*, and is with equal indifference This as well as that – such a thing we call a *universal*. So it is in fact the universal that is the true [content] of sense-certainty. (65, ¶96)

This is an important conclusion. Sense-certainty identifies knowledge as *immediate presence* and as a *relation between individuals*. But such immediate presence can at best be a merely subjective possession; it is evanescent and absolutely resists capture in any durable form or expression. Insofar as there is a substantial relation between the individuals even in so-called immediate knowledge, it is mediated by universality, and this shows up even in the attempt to express the immediacy, the "this." The evanescence and subjectivity of such immediacy are linked in this case. What seemed to be the most fundamental form of objectivity, the very structure in which objects first come to be for consciousness, turns out to be, itself, subjective and *merely* ideal. Absent the mediation of the universal, it turns out that immediacy is like Gertrude Stein's Oakland: There is no "there" there.

The important conclusion that “this” and its specific forms are universals is not yet the conclusion of the “sense-Certainty” chapter itself. Arguments that “I” and the subject of knowledge are also essentially mediated by the universal follow the passages I have so far highlighted. But these lessons or experiences are not yet enough to force sense-certainty out beyond itself. Quite the contrary, it now contracts fully into the moment, refusing to consider anything outside the immediacy on which it is so focused:

Thus we reach the stage where we have to posit the *whole* of sense-certainty itself as its *essence*, and no longer only one of its moments, as happened in the two cases where first the object confronting the “I,” and then the “I,” were supposed to be its reality. Thus it is only sense-certainty as a *whole* which stands firm within itself as *immediacy* and by so doing excludes from itself all the opposition which has hitherto obtained. (67, ¶103)

Sense-certainty seeks to escape the mediation of the universal by simply ignoring it, by refusing to acknowledge that there are other nows and heres different from the particular immediacy of the moment. Hegel asserts that we have to inhabit the point of view of such sense-certainty to uncover the lessons it learns, its experience.

When we make the move to inhabiting this point of view, we discover, Hegel tells us, that

The “Now,” and pointing out the “Now,” are thus so constituted that neither the one nor the other is something immediate and simple, but a movement which contains various moments. (68, ¶107)

The movement implicit in such pointing-out is given an abstract description at the beginning of this paragraph, but the more concrete illustration given towards the end of the paragraph is much easier to follow:

a Now which is an absolute plurality of Nows. And this is the true, the genuine Now, the Now as a simple day which contains within it many Nows – hours. A Now of this sort, an hour, similarly is many minutes, and this Now is likewise many Nows, and so on. The pointing-out of the Now is thus itself the movement which expresses what the Now is in truth, viz. a result, or a plurality of Nows all taken together. (68, ¶107)

The point of central concern to us here stands out even more clearly in what Hegel says about the Here:

The *Here pointed out*, to which I hold fast, is similarly a *this* Here which, in fact is *not* this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left. The Above is itself similarly this manifold otherness of above, below, etc. (68, ¶108)

In reading these passages, we have to keep in mind that Hegel’s emphasis on the *process* involved in demonstrations forces us to take a double lesson here. Not only is the *object* of the demonstration, the Now or the Here, a determinate object only to the extent that it is located in a whole system of like objects, but also the demonstration *itself* is the determinate demonstration it is only because it is located in a system of other possible demonstrations. The pointing-out of concern makes sense – indeed, is *possible* – only to the extent that it is one element or occurrence in a whole set of actual and possible such pointings-out. The crucial fact is that a pointing-out is a pointing-out, and especially the particular pointing-out that it is only because it occurs within and against a background of demonstrative *practices* that determine a complex *space* of possible demonstrations. This background of demonstrative practices is normatively constituted and accounts for the normative (read: conceptual) force of any particular act of demonstration.

If, then, every demonstration is essentially dependent on a complex system that includes other possible demonstrations, both similar and contrasting, no demonstration is a “pure this.” Every demonstration possesses its determinacy in virtue of its place in a complex system of possibilities, a complex classificatory system. The implicit but complex classificatory system against the background of which any act of demonstration must emerge has some categorial structure, whether it is the relatively abstract/formal categorial structure of space (this *place*), or time (this *moment*), or the categorial structure of the sensory (this *color* or this *smell*), the physical (this *physical object*), or something else (this *thought*). A “pure this” would be an act of demonstration the determinate character of which is independent of any classificatory system or categorial structure. We have just seen that no demonstrative act has a determinate character independent of all schemes of demonstrative practices. Every demonstration is, therefore, already a this-such, and necessarily so. Hegel fills in what Sellars, at least in the opening chapter of *Science and Metaphysics*, left blank. Hegel tells us what is “that peculiar way in which to represent something as a *this* is conceptual.”¹⁸ It is to represent something immediately and as in direct relation to one but within a presupposed background scheme of classification that itself must be considered conceptual and general. That background scheme of classification provides a normative standard by which demonstrations can be assessed as correct or incorrect, as justifying some further representations but not others.

¹⁸ Sellars (1967), §7: 3.

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Kant believed that his predecessors had all either intellectualized appearances or sensationalized concepts.¹⁹ Interpreters like Sellars and McDowell, however, point out that simply deintellectualizing appearances and desensationalizing concepts is not really an option for, split asunder, there would be no possibility of explaining the ultimate unity of sensibility and understanding in experience. According to Sellars, Kant never did settle on a way to leave enough intellect in appearances or sufficient sensory content in concepts to make the joint activity of receptivity and spontaneity perfectly clear.

Sellars proposes his “this-such” model of Kantian intuition, in part, because it provides a way for him to clarify how intuition can be conceptual and the corresponding appearances intellectual while keeping them sufficiently distinct from the conceptual, strictly so-called. What I have argued here is that in the “sense-Certainty” chapter of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel provides us with a much more detailed argument than is provided by either Kant or Sellars to establish how and why intuition construed on the model of demonstratives must necessarily be regarded as conceptual in the broad sense required by Kant and his contemporary interpreters like Sellars and McDowell. Hegel’s argument brings to the fore the fact that there are no lone isolated demonstrative acts, and therefore no lone isolated intuitions. Every demonstration, and therefore every intuition, is the determinate act it is because it occurs within and against a background of demonstrative practices that license and indeed ultimately demand the normative assessment of the individual demonstrative acts.

Sellars also proposes his “this-such” model of Kantian intuitions because it enables him to hold on to the idea that a distinction can sensibly be drawn within Kant’s scheme between synthesized intuition and the deliverances of “sheer receptivity.” This is where Sellars and McDowell (as I understand him) part company, for McDowell thinks that we cannot make sense of the notion of sheer receptivity. It is tempting to think that Sellars’ “this-such” model accommodates the notion of sheer receptivity by associating it with the “this,” leaving the “such” to be associated with the conceptual element in intuition. But I think that is not Sellars’s intention, and careful consideration of Hegel’s argument helps us see why: there is no pure “this.” The manifold of sheer receptivity, according to Sellars, is not

¹⁹ Kant (*CPR*), A271/B327.

yet a "this" in its being-for-consciousness. A non-conceptual aspect to a "this-such" need not reduce to a non-conceptual *part* to a "this-such."

The argument we have found in "Sense-Certainty" to reinforce the idea that our most immediate cognitive contact with objects in the world is conceptual is itself still compatible with this Sellarsian idea. There is still room for the concept of sensation, even given the lessons, the experience, of sense-certainty. Whether Hegel made use of that room and what use he may have made of it is a story for another time.