SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT: SOUL, CONSCIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE AND WILL

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THE TEXTS

Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (PSS) occupies an important place in his system. The system has three major parts: the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The Philosophy of Spirit itself has three parts: the PSS, the Philosophy of Objective Spirit and the Philosophy of Absolute Spirit. The PSS, then, stands at the transition from nature to spirit and thus contains important material concerning the relation of nature and spirit. Furthermore, objective spirit concerns the various forms of relation among agents within a rational society; subjective spirit analyses the elements necessary for or presupposed by such relations, namely, the structures characteristic of and necessary to the individual rational agent. The PSS analyses the fundamental nature of the biological/spiritual human individual along with the cognitive and the practical prerequisites of human social interaction.

Given the importance of Hegel's PSS, the level of scholarly attention it has received is disappointing. Only his philosophy of nature currently receives less attention from Hegel scholars. To some degree, this situation derives from the fact that one part of the PSS, the Phenomenology of Spirit – the middle third that sits between the Anthropology and the Psychology – corresponds to the first five chapters of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) with the same title. The literature on PhG is massive, and the Phenomenology of the 1830 Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enc) gets lost in its shadow.

Effectively, many Hegel scholars substitute the 1807 volume for the PSS when thinking about Hegel's system. PhG is far more detailed than the Phenomenology in Enc (though Hegel clearly changed his mind on some issues after writing the former), and is a text of sweeping vision. The historical as well as systematic contexts of PhG and Enc differ. It is a major interpretative challenge in Hegel scholarship to understand the relation between the large, complex, and sometimes ungainly PhG, which was billed as an introduction to Hegel's systematic philosophy, and the compressed, telegraphic Phenomenology of Spirit that occupies a place within the encyclopaedic system. The focus here is solely on the latter.
THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL: SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The concern to understand the nature of the human individual that dominated early modern philosophy from Descartes and Spinoza through Locke, Hume and Kant is also the central concern in Hegel’s PSS. But Hegel approaches the issue in a radically different way from his pre-Kantian predecessors. I will start by summarizing the common assumptions shared among Kant’s predecessors.

Pre-Kantian thinking about the individual’s relation to the material natural world, the internal resources native to humans and the basic prerequisites of human relationships adopted a common generic theoretical framework that we can call (following Locke) ‘the new way of ideas’. This framework assumes a deep ontological distinction between extended material objects (bodies) and immaterial, thinking or experiencing objects (minds). Bodies are thought to interact according to rigorously mathematizable and exceptionless laws of nature of the kind being discovered by the then emerging new sciences of astronomy, mechanics and optics. Causation is generally conceived of along mechanistic lines, and teleological causation and explanation are also generally rejected. Minds, in contrast, contain (consist of?) ideas, usually characterized in terms of their representational content, that interact according to normative rules of reason. Ideas are taken to have a fundamentally compositional structure: there is a supply of simple ideas that can be compounded into complex ideas – though the forms of composition recognized in this framework were quite limited. It is also a standard pre-Kantian assumption that minds have some form of immediate and transparent access to the ideas they contain.

(Descartes, for instance, defends such a claim at the end of the Second Meditation: see *Descartes Oeuvres* [AT] VII:33.) Thought is identified with the processes of composition and analysis operating on ideas. Our knowledge of the existence and characteristics of material bodies is taken to be mediated by knowledge of our own mental states, thus remaining always more problematic than self-knowledge.

These assumptions were shared broadly among Kant’s predecessors, but there were numerous specific differences. The rationalists believed that the simple ideas are highly abstract and innate in the very structure of the mind, and that a great deal of knowledge about the fundamental structure of the world is encoded in them, affording insight into necessary truths concerning the supersensible realm and our spiritual nature. The empiricists, in contrast, thought that the simple ideas are particular sensory images, from which all our other ideas are derived or compounded by de facto faculties (such as innate abilities to compare or to abstract ideas) in accordance with certain laws of association. The dialectic of empiricist thought led empiricism to a rather unhappy scepticism according to which conclusions that reach even a little beyond the senses cannot be justified, and the only necessities we can cognize are trivial.

Kant began to revolutionize this framework. He enriched the framework of ‘ideas’, distinguishing in a meaningful way between sensory and conceptual representations, and employing the logical forms of judgement to provide a more sophisticated notion of the relationships among representations. He recognized that representations in a judgement are combined with a modal force that signals that the combination is not merely subjective association. Kant argued that the innate architecture of the mind determines certain
complex representations to be necessarily true. Yet he also argued that these judgements can hold true only of the phenomenal world revealed by sensory experience. The supersensible realm remains beyond our ken. Kant thus tried to validate more knowledge than the empiricists thought to be obtainable (namely, knowledge of the necessary structure of the phenomenal realm), without acceding to rationalist metaphysical pretensions concerning the supersensible realm. But Kant remains mired in a highly dualistic framework: the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal cannot be overcome, so that human beings can neither know the nature of reality as it is in itself, nor can they know themselves as free, rational, moral agents. In the end, Kant denies knowledge to make room for faith.

SHIFTING THE PARADIGM: HEGELIAN REVISIONS

Hegel is deeply dissatisfied with both the metaphysics and the methodologies employed by his predecessors, so dissatisfied that he proclaims that ‘Aristotle’s books on the soul, as well as his dissertations on its special aspects and conditions, are still by far the best or even the sole work of speculative interest on this general topic’ (Enc §378). Understanding why Hegel is so dissatisfied with his predecessors’ paradigm is important to grasping his approach.

Let us start with Hegel’s complaints about methodologies commonly used in the philosophy of mind. The philosophy of spirit aims at cognition of spirit itself; it is the execution of the ‘absolute command, Know thyself’. Is this an injunction to know oneself in a narrow sense: What are my particular characteristics, abilities, etc.? Hegel rejects this reading: the philosophy of subjective spirit ‘is concerned with cognition of human truth, with that which is true in and for itself, – with essence itself as spirit’ (Enc §377). Merely including knowledge of the characteristics and foibles of those around us is also ruled out by this test. The philosophy of mind looks for the truly universal across all humans. Hegel then identifies two ways this universal project has been approached recently: first, so-called rational psychology; second, empirical psychology (Enc §§377–8). Both these approaches are faulty, however, because mired in the ‘categories of the understanding’. This means that certain aspects of the phenomenon under consideration are regarded as ‘separate and fixed’ (Enc §378A) and form an independent basis from which all other aspects are to be derived.

Empirical psychology reaches towards the universal by generalizing from empirical observation of particular spiritual faculties:

In empirical psychology, it is the particularizations into which spirit is divided which are regarded as being rigid in their limitation, so that spirit is treated as a mere aggregate of independent forces, each of which stands only in reciprocal and therefore external relation to the other. (Enc §378A; Petry translation adapted)

Empirical psychology however cannot demonstrate the ‘harmonious integration’ of the powers or faculties it discovers, that is, the necessary unity they must exhibit in order to exist as powers of a unified spirit.

Rational psychology or pneumatology concerns itself, not with empirical research and data, but ‘with abstract and general determinations, with the supposedly unmanifest essence, the in itself of spirit’ (ibid.; Petry...
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translation adapted). The problem is that rational psychology assumes that its job is to demonstrate the simplicity, immateriality and immortality of the soul.

These questions, true to the general character of the understanding, in that they took spirit to be a thing, assumed these categories to be static and fixed. As such the categories are incapable of expressing the nature of spirit however, for far from being anything static, spirit is absolute unrest, pure activity, the negating or ideality of all the fixed determinations of the understanding. (Enc §378A)

I especially want to emphasize here Hegel’s criticism of rational psychology for treating spirit as a thing. Of course, the pneumatologists did not think that spirits are physical things, but they did think of spirit as a determinate thing entirely separable from one’s body. In Hegel’s view, this dualism makes unintelligible the relation between the natural, physical side of humans and their spiritual aspect. For spirit

is not abstractly simple, for it differentiates itself from itself in its simplicity, nor is it already complete prior to its being manifest, an essence maintaining itself behind the range of its manifestations, for it is only truly actual through the determinate forms of its necessary self-revelation. This [rationalist] psychology imagined it to be a thing, a soul standing in a merely external relation to the body, but [in truth] it is inwardly connected with the body through the unity of the concept. (Enc §378A; Petry translation adapted)

As long as we are tied to the separate and fixed categories of the understanding, an appreciation of spirit’s true nature is beyond reach.

We see here as well that method and metaphysics cannot be kept entirely separate. The attitude of understanding is both a method – atomistic analysis and reconstructive composition – and a metaphysics – the assumption that the world is fundamentally a composite of determinate atoms with fixed properties combinable in fixed and determinate ways. It takes reason, which is more than mere understanding, to appreciate the creative negativity operative in the world.

Hegel cites the recent discovery of ‘animal magnetism’ – what we now call hypnotism – as an empirical confirmation of the inadequacy of the attitude of understanding.¹ ‘This has discredited all the rigid distinctions drawn by the understanding, and it has become immediately obvious that if contradictions are to be resolved, a speculative consideration is a necessity’ (Enc §379). It is worth looking at what Hegel took hypnotic phenomena to show. He devotes to them in §406, as Petry notes in the Introduction to his translation of PSS (vol. I, p. lviii), ‘the most extensive and detailed exposition of any one topic in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, and one of the most extensive expositions of the whole Encyclopedia’. Hegel took hypnotism seriously, despite its having an air of charlatanry about it already in the early nineteenth century.

The understanding is at least capable of apprehending, in an external manner, the other conditions and natural determinations, as well as the conscious activities of spirit. It can also grasp what is called the natural course of things, the external connection of cause and effect, by which, like finite things, it is itself dominated. It is however evidently incapable of ascribing even credibility to the phenomena of animal magnetism, for in this instance it is no longer possible for it to regard
spirit as being completely fixed and bounded in place and time as well as by the postulated connection of cause and effect. It is therefore faced with what it cannot regard as anything but an incredible miracle, the appearance within sensuous existence of spirit’s having raised itself above extrinsicality and its external connections. (Enc §379A; Petry translation adapted; cf. GW 25/1:161)

The idea seems to be roughly this: the understanding treats things as compositions of externally related objects, bound together by spatio-temporal and causal relations. To an extent, the activities of spirit can be so understood, but this misses their essence. This is evident when it comes to hypnotism. Hypnotic phenomena in which, for example, one person tastes what another eats or acts in immediate accord with another’s will, cannot be accommodated within the paradigm of the understanding. Hegel thinks that the holism of the spiritual and the rational, in distinction from the atomism of the understanding, comes to the fore in such phenomena.

Interestingly, the phenomena of hypnotism are still not well understood, though hypnotism is a very real and interesting condition. Few today would boldly assert that it will remain forever impenetrable to scientific investigation, but one point made by Hegel remains viable even today. This is precisely the anti-atomist claim that spiritual (or, as we now call them, ‘mental’) phenomena will not be made intelligible using bottom-up, atomistic methods alone. Even starting with mental atoms, such as pre-Kantian ideas, will not enable an atomistic explanation of spiritual phenomena, because the realm of the spiritual or mental is essentially holistic in structure. Hegel believes that the notion of the spiritual is so tied to a systematic and teleological view of the world that apparently distinct spiritual items like different sensations, feelings, thoughts and actions can be what they are only in virtue of their role in the self-realization of the absolute; this point of view entails seeing the world-whole as a spiritual phenomenon.

This is not to say that in the explanation of each individual thought or action reference must be made to its contribution to the self-realization of the absolute. But regarding an organism as a person, or regarding a particular behaviour as the expression of a thought or as the execution of an action, presupposes that these phenomena fit into a highly differentiated and teleologically organized world-order. A related though less radical view can be seen in the rise of externalism in contemporary philosophy of mind. ‘Content externalism’ as defended by Burge (1979) and ‘active externalism’ as defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998) both reject the possibility of identifying mental states atomistically, based solely on what is ‘in the head’, whether that is construed physically as what is within the boundary of a person’s skin or skull, or mentally in terms of what is ‘present to consciousness’ at a moment. The very architecture of mentalistic language involves essential reference to the environment and social context, so minds and their states cannot be treated as atomistically isolated ‘things’ separable from and independent of their environment. The boundary between the mental and the social begins to evaporate, as it does in Hegel’s concept of spirit. We no longer think of hypnotism as an example of the mind’s extension beyond the boundaries of the skull, but the larger point Hegel draws retains its interest in contemporary philosophy of mind.

With this in view, one can make sense of Hegel’s claims that spirit is the ‘truth of nature’ (Enc §381), that its essence is...
freedom (§382) and that its determinateness is manifestation (§383). Let us take these in reverse order.

Manifestation amounts to self-revelation, but the real point for Hegel is that there is ultimately no distinction between the form and the content of the manifestation. Spirit is, indeed, manifest in things unable to recognize their own spirituality, things which are therefore at best partial or imperfect manifestations of spirit, such as nature. Yet spirit itself manifests itself to itself and thereby knows itself. It does this by finding itself in an ostensible other.

For spirit, rather than losing itself in this other, maintains and actualizes itself there, shaping its internality by turning the other into a determinate being commensurate with it, and by thus sublating the other, the determinate and actual difference, reaching concrete being-for-self, determinate self-revelation to itself. This revelation is therefore itself the content of spirit, and not some form merely added from without to the content of spirit. (Enc §383A; Petry translation adapted)

Effectively, we come to know ourselves as spirit, and thus we actualize spirit, in shaping the world into a site appropriate for and responsive to our free, rational activity. Spirit realizes itself (in both senses of actualizing itself and knowing itself) ever better by tuning the world to its purposes. The freedom that is the essence of spirit is not a matter of being cut off from and independent of nature, but of being at home in the world because spirit has transformed the world’s material reality into an expression of itself and is able therein to sustain and support the rational activity that it is. Such freedom is fully actualizable only in a well-structured, cultured society that recognizes both the individuality and the communality of rational agents. This characterization, of course, goes beyond the boundaries of subjective spirit into the realms of objective and absolute spirit. Yet it is a clear corollary to Hegel’s position that subjective spirit could not exist as something ‘really distinct’ (in Cartesian terms) from the kind of body humans possess or from the kinds of social structures peculiar to humans.

The PSS is divided into three major parts: Anthropology, Phenomenology of Spirit and Psychology. Each of these is itself divided into a further triad with at least one more subordinate level of triads below that. The text of Enc is notoriously abstract and telegraphic, even supplemented by the material from Hegel’s lectures, it is challenging to trace a coherent web of claims and justifications in this text. In the following I sketch a systematic overview of the problems Hegel was responding to and of the positions he developed. It is worth pointing out, in light of the fascination exerted by the 1807 PhG, that when the volume was written, Hegel had not yet developed the conceptions of anthropology and psychology that came to frame the phenomenology in the mature system. His conception of these disciplines was initially developed during his time in Nuremberg (1808–16). Thus, the systematic context of the phenomenology changes significantly between the early tome and the mature system.

1. THE ANTHROPOLOGY

The Anthropology, the first major division of the PSS, encompasses 24 paragraphs (§§388–412) in both the second and third editions of Enc. It concerns spirit in its
immediate unity with nature and the natural organism. This form of spirit Hegel calls ‘soul’. Both the unity of and any distinction between nature and spirit or organism and spirit at this level is not for spirit. Spirit is here still not conscious of itself under any description. ‘Anthropology’ seems, then, a strange title for this segment of PSS, for we tend to think that the distinctive trait of humans is their self-consciousness, their awareness of themselves as conscious and spirited creatures. This is exactly what is not considered in Hegel’s Anthropology. Rather, the focus here is on embodiment, on the way in which qualities and characteristics of humans that appear, at first blush, to be simply natural have spiritual significance and express the spiritual. These qualities must ultimately be understood as having their true identity, not in the self-externality of causal processes among distinct spatio-temporal objects and states, but in their participation in the processes of self-realization in which spirit expresses and fulfills itself. Racial differences, differences in temperament and character, the ‘natural’ processes of growth and development, sexuality and wakefulness are all discussed at the beginning of the Anthropology as phenomena that are, of course, natural, but equally spiritual, that is, to be understood in terms of a larger whole.

The greatest amount of space in the Anthropology is devoted to discussing sensation and feeling. Understanding the nature of the sensory is a challenge to any philosophy, and Hegel’s attempt is complex and sometimes obscure. We need to be clear at the outset that Hegel does not take sensation and feeling to be uniquely human; animals also have sensation and feeling. As we will see, Hegel even identifies what makes something sentient. He also distinguishes between mere sensation and feeling, which is a slightly higher-level phenomenon. But the importance of sensation cannot be sold short:

Everything is in sensation; one might also say that it is in sensation that everything emerging into spiritual consciousness and reason has its source and origin, for the source and origin of something is nothing other than the primary and most immediate manner in which it appears. Principles, religion etc. must be in the heart, they must be sensed, it is not enough that they should be only in the head. (Enc §400R)

This passage is both a bow to what is true in empiricism and an acknowledgement that one cannot stop with empiricism’s immediacies.

One of the faults Hegel regularly finds with empiricism is its general atomism, and this echoes throughout the Anthropology. Hegel thinks of living organisms as complex beings that are significantly more unified than other physical objects.

In the plant there is already a display of a centre diffused into the periphery, a concentration of differences, a self-development outwards from within, a unity which differentiates itself and brings itself forth out of its differences into the bud, and consequently into something to which we ascribe a drive . . . In the animal organism externality is more completely overcome, for each organ engenders the other, being its cause and effect, means and end. Each member is therefore simultaneously its own other. What is more, the whole of the animal organism is so pervaded by its unity, that nothing within it appears as independent. Since each determinacy is at the same time of an ideal nature, the animal remaining the same single universal within each
determinacy, it is in the animal body that extrinsicality shows the full extent of its lack of truth. (Enc §381A)

There are strong reverberations here of Kant’s characterization of teleology as something we must attribute to organisms. Hegel thinks that the greater unity of the animal accounts for its being sentient. ‘Sensation is precisely this ubiquity of the unity of the animal in all its members, which immediately communicate each impression to the single whole’ (ibid.). Hegel’s most complete attempt to explain the nature of sensation appears in the unfinished manuscript of a projected book-length treatment of subjective spirit:

If neutral water is coloured, for example, and is in this quality or condition, then it would be sentient if it differed from this its condition not only for us or, what amounts to the same thing, merely according to possibility, but rather if, at the same time, it differed from itself as so determined. Differently expressed: the genus colour only exists as blue, or as a certain specific colour; in that it is blue, it remains the genus colour. But if the colour as colour, i.e., not as blueness but at the same time as colour persisting in opposition to itself as blue colour—if the difference between its universality and its particularity were not simply for us but existed within itself, then blue colour would be a sensation of blue. (GW15:234; Petry translation revised)

The idea seems to be that sensations are peculiar because, although they are in one sense simply properties of sensory organs, what they are as sensations depends crucially on their occurrence in the context of a complex organic whole, namely as particular properties of sense organs that provide a way for the whole organism to tune its condition to a specific aspect of the world. Thus, sensations are not objects of awareness, but components or aspects of acts of awareness. Further, these states occur because they occupy a particular point in a sensory range that is significant for the whole organism. This is consistent with Hegel’s general strategy of arguing that something first seen atomistically from the bottom–up, reveals a very different identity when seen in a holistic (and teleological) context from the top–down, and that it is the top–down identity that is, in the long run, the more important. This also helps explain what Hegel means when he insists that ‘everything is in sensation’: to the extent that we have truly appropriated an idea, no matter how abstract, it will make a difference in our immediate sensory encounters with the world. Someone who cannot feel moral indignation or does not feel a gut-wrenching sensation when betrayed may be able to think about morality, but is not a moral person, not someone whose very being is informed by morality. ‘In general, sentience is the individual spirit living in healthy partnership with its corporeity’ (Enc §401R).

I have gotten ahead of the game here by introducing already the notion of feeling. Hegel distinguishes relatively clearly between sensation and feeling only in the third edition of Enc:

Linguistic practice happens to provide us with no thoroughgoing distinction between sensation and feeling. Nevertheless, we do tend to speak not of a sensation of right, self and suchlike, but of a feeling for what is right, of self-awareness . . . [W]hile sensation puts more emphasis upon the passive aspect of feeling . . . , i.e., upon the immediacy of feeling’s determinacy, feeling refers more to the selfhood involved here. (Enc §402R)
What we call the feeling soul . . . is neither confined to the immediate sensuousness of sensation, [e.g., to a proper or common sensible] and dependent upon immediate sensuous presence nor does it relate itself to what is wholly universal, which can be grasped only through the mediation of pure thought. (Enc §402A; Petry translation adapted)

The notion of feeling allows Hegel to ascribe a kind of content to a mental state that is neither the determinate singularity of a proper or common sensible nor the objectivizing universality of concept. A feeling of moral indignation is not yet a concept of moral indignation, but it is more than a particular proprioceptive sensible. There will be some proprioceptive sensible involved in the feeling, but what it truly is can be understood only in terms of a larger context. That feeling is an immediate, embodied response to a situation that conflicts with morality by someone in whom a moral upbringing has inculcated both moral habits and some conception of morality. Purely sensory comparisons and discriminations, such as those we make when discriminating colours or analysing flavour notes in a fine wine, are tied to the structure of our sensory organs. Feeling, by contrast, has a much broader range. Craftsmen acquire a feel for their materials, politicians a feel for the mood of the public. Whereas in the purely sensory cases we are passive, accepting the deliverances of sense (or learning to ‘read’ such deliverances), in feeling often a great deal of experience, training or knowledge is unconsciously active.

This permits Hegel to discuss the importance of preconscious comparisons and discriminations in our cognitive and conative architecture. Preconscious abilities to compare and distinguish, however, are not open to direct introspection. Hegel discusses a number of pathological phenomena in this section of the Anthropology. When things are going well for us, when we correctly perceive or anticipate the world around us and respond to it appropriately, everything seems simple, and the complexity of our connection to the world fades from sight. It is when our normal, relatively happy intercourse with the world, ourselves and others breaks down that the complex architecture of the preconscious mind becomes visible. There are extensive discussions of dreaming, of ‘magnetic somnambulism’, and of mental derangements of various kinds in these sections of the Anthropology, for in all of these, Hegel thinks, there is a breakdown in the ‘healthy partnership’ between an individual spirit and its corporeity.

There is no room here for a detailed review of Hegel’s discussions of the pathologies of mind, but he was clearly concerned with and aware of the cutting-edge empirical and clinical work of the time.

At the end of the Anthropology, Hegel provides a lengthy and significant discussion of habit. Prior to this, he treated the unity of the bodily and the spiritual in terms of individual phenomena, sensations and feelings that, though bodily, have to be seen as an expression or manifestation of something larger and higher, a spiritual reality. Habit provides a form in which the organism can gain some freedom from the sensuous particularities of sense and feeling while becoming a still better expression of spirit. Habit is, indeed, a mere form itself; any kind of content, good or ill, progressive or regressive, effective or ineffective can be embodied in a habit.

The essential determination of habit is that it is by means of it that man is liberated from the sensations by which he is
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affected . . . [H]abit is what is most essential to the existence of all spirituality within the individual subject. It enables the subject to be a concrete immediacy, an ideality of soul, so that the religious or moral etc. content belongs to him as this self, this soul, and is in him neither merely . . . a transient sensation or presentation, nor as an abstract inwardness cut off from action and actuality, but as part of his being. (Enc §410R; Petry translation adapted)

Through the development of habits, we are less in the thrall of particular feelings: we can become inured to pain; we can postpone pleasure. A self that is no longer a merely immediate responsiveness to the world can begin to emerge. We can think of the progress through the Anthropology along the following lines. The significance of individual states of the organism for the organism itself can only be seen by taking a systematic look at their place in the overall fit of the organism into its environment. Some states are general, such as those that track time (like biological clocks), but some express particularities of the organism. For instance, animal organisms all have a sense of self, of their boundaries, of where they are in relation to their environment (e.g. as prey and predator) or a sense of who they mate with. Such ‘self-feeling’ is unconscious and highly particularized to the moment. In acquiring habits, the organism can begin to abstract from this direct immersion in nature and build for itself a ‘second nature’. Without it, a distinctively human nature would not be possible.

The Anthropology culminates in what Hegel calls ‘the actual soul’. It is at this stage, I believe (though Hegel does not explicitly say so), that humanity goes beyond anything available to animals, which are never fully actual souls. Since the soul, within its thoroughly formed and appropriated corporeity, is as the being-for-self of a single subject, this corporeity is externality as a predicate in which the subject relates only to itself. This externality exhibits not itself, but the soul of which it is the sign. (Enc §411; Petry translation adapted)

In the human species, the natural organism has become both sign and expression of something that is, like all signifieds, distinguishable from it. Indeed, the organism is not even a terribly good expression of spirit:

[B]ecause this [human] shape is something immediate and natural in its externality, [it] can therefore only signify spirit in an indefinite and wholly imperfect manner, being incapable of presenting it as the universal it is for itself. For the animal, the human shape is the highest appearance of spirit. For spirit however, it is only the first appearance of itself, and language simultaneously its more perfect expression. (Enc §411R; Petry translation adapted)

Language, however, does not receive explicit consideration until later in the Psychology. Still, there is an abstract unity, the centre of gravity around which the otherwise disparate bodily, sensory and habitual characteristics of the organism are organized. This unity differs from these disparate characteristics, which it excludes from itself. Yet by being their unity or universal, it is incapable of existing apart from them:

In so far as the soul has being for abstract universality, this being-for-self of free universality is its higher awakening as ‘I’ or abstract universality. For itself, the soul is therefore thought and subject, and is indeed specifically the subject of
its judgement. In this judgement the ‘I’ excludes from itself the natural totality of its determinations as an object or world external to it, and so relates itself to this totality that it is immediately reflected into itself within it. This is consciousness. (Enc §412; Petry translation adapted)

Hegel here identifies consciousness with an abstract point of unity that stands over against a de facto disparate manifold in sense and feeling. This echoes Kant’s conception of consciousness as a unity of manifold representations and prepares the move to the next part of the PSS, the Phenomenology of Spirit, which considers the appropriate forms for the normative or de jure unification of the determinations found within spirit.

2. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

A. The Idea of a Phenomenology

The Phenomenology of the PSS occupies 26 paragraphs (Enc §§413–39). This is two more than the Anthropology, but there is considerably less supplementary material in the Additions. The lecture notes show that Hegel kept increasing the amount of lecture time spent on the Anthropology at the expense of the other parts of subjective spirit.

The Phenomenology is narrowly focused on examining subjective spirit’s relation to appearances. Since subjective spirit is something that both appears and is appeared to, this imposes structural requirements on it that are examined dialectically in this segment of the PSS. Hegel’s absolute idealism is in many ways deeply realistic in its metaphysics and has little in common with the epistemologically motivated idealism found, for instance, in Bishop Berkeley or in the phenomenology of Mill. In the framework of the Encyclopaedia Phenomenology, however, the objects of consciousness are indeed treated as internal constructs of spirit. The determinations of soul—the sensations and feelings discussed in the Anthropology—are, in and for themselves, without objective reference for soul. The feeling that embodies one’s indignation at a social slight, for instance, is not for the soul itself a recognition of or response to a social slight—that aspect of this determination of soul is for us, for some external or reflective viewer cognizant of its larger, objective context. The body considered in the Anthropology may express spirit, but at the level of soul spirit cannot yet interpret itself or its state.

The Phenomenology investigates a new and more complex way in which a human relates to itself. The high level of structure and integration present in what Hegel calls ‘the actual soul’ effectively enables a new kind of reflexive relation to itself. We have to take seriously the remark quoted above that ‘the “I” excludes from itself the natural totality of its determinations as an object or world external to it, and so relates itself to this totality that it is immediately reflected into itself within it’ (Enc §412). The abstract unity of the organism—which we now call the ‘I’—stands over against the soul’s particular determinations (specifically the sensations and feelings) which, from the point of view of the ‘I’, are now regarded as independent, natural objects that are not the ‘I’’s own determinations but external to it. Spirit must now consciously return to itself by coming to see itself in those apparently external objects. It thereby returns as well to the larger world when it sees these determinations of
itself as nonetheless also expressions of the truth of the world.

Clearly, the Encyclopaedia Phenomenology echoes Kant’s critical philosophy. The phenomenological point of view shares with critical philosophy the notion that the world we sense and experience is a reconstruction from (or is it a construal of?) our sensory and feeling states. Thus, Hegel asserts: ‘The Kantian philosophy is most accurately assessed in that it is considered as having grasped spirit as consciousness, and as containing throughout not the philosophy of spirit, but merely determinations of its phenomenology’ (Enc §415R). The difference between the two, however, is that Kant thought that his approach entailed that our knowledge is confined to the merely phenomenal: things as they are in themselves remain forever beyond our ken. Hegel instead locates the constructive activities examined in the phenomenology within a broadly monistic world. That objects necessarily appear to us under certain constraints, Hegel thinks, does not entail that we have access to merely phenomenal objects. Rather, to the extent that the constraints under which objects appear to us appropriately capture constraints on the objects themselves, to that same extent we can know the truth of those objects. The very same organizing structures and principles that are active in the rational mind are also active and determinative in the world itself. The rational mind has access to the truth, not merely to the appearance of truth. The world is in itself what it appears to be to the fully developed rational mind.

B. CONSCIOUSNESS AS SUCH

(i) Sensuous consciousness

The organism has achieved the brute ability to represent itself (the ‘I’) as something distinct from and independent of the material determinacies of feeling, which it represents in turn as objects distinct from and independent of itself. These objects appear to it as immediate, simple others. ‘Of the object therefore, sensuous consciousness knows only that it is a being, something, an existing thing, a singular etc. Although this consciousness appears as the richest in content, it is the poorest in thought’ (Enc §418R). Consciousness cannot long stay in this framework:

From this standpoint I become aware of this unit [a conglomeration of sensations and feelings] in an immediate and singularized manner. It enters my consciousness at random, and disappears out of it again. To me it is therefore something which, with regard to both its existence and its constitution, is simply given, so that I know nothing of whence it comes, the derivation of its specific nature, or of its claim to truth. (Enc §418A)

Sensuous consciousness, as such, is utterly unfocused, a mere assurance of being but unable to put its finger on anything. Perception is a higher and more adequate form in which consciousness escapes this scattered, unfocusable form.

One specific difference between the treatment of sensuous consciousness in the Encyclopaedia Phenomenology and its treatment in PhG needs mention. In Enc, Hegel no longer thinks that sensuous consciousness is concerned with spatio-temporality, the here and the now, which plays a significant role in the arguments of the Sense Certainty chapter in PhG. These arguments expose the ultimately conceptual structure of indexical reference; in Enc, however, the application of spatio-temporal representations to sensory experience is proclaimed to be the province of intuition, which is treated later in the Psychology.
(ii) Perception

The drive hidden within the phenomenological spirit is, of course, the drive to know itself, which underlies the dialectic of all of subjective spirit. Spirit certainly cannot find itself or its equivalent in the scattered manifold of singularities that dominates sensuous consciousness. In spirit’s experience, the mere ‘somethings’ of sensuous consciousness become things it perceives, that is, loci of many distinct properties related to a common focus. The sensuous determinations spirit finds given to it are now organized for it in accordance with certain categories that classify and relate them together into structured objects and events.

[Perception] starts with the sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised into truth by being considered in their connection, reflected upon, and at the same time, turned by means of certain categories into structured objects and events.

Hegel says that this is the standpoint of ordinary consciousness and of most of the sciences, and that it marks the boundaries of Kantian philosophy. This last seems a bit contentious: many interpreters think Kant’s philosophy achieves at least the level of the understanding, to which we now turn.

(iii) Understanding

Consciousness becomes aware in perception that the objects it encounters are appearances, so it begins to focus on the internality underlying and uniting the manifold appearances: ‘This simple difference is the realm of the laws of appearance, their quiescent and universal likeness’ (Enc §422).

The truly internal has however to be defined as concrete, as internally differentiated. Grasped as such it constitutes what we call law, for the essence of law, whether referred to external nature or to the ethical world, consists of an indivisible unity, a necessary internal connection of different determinations . . . Laws are the determinations of the understanding dwelling within the world itself. It is within laws therefore that the understanding consciousness rediscovers its own nature and so becomes its own opposing object. (Enc §422A; Petry translation adapted)

The understanding takes the truth to consist in the (invisible) laws that knit together the various objects, properties and relations that appear to consciousness. But the understanding does not yet see that the organizing principles it now identifies as the truth are, in fact, its very own. Thus, a new kind of object is now appropriate, an object that is itself a consciousness.

It is worth pausing a moment here to make it clear that from within the Phenomenology, the ‘stages’ of spirit being traversed do not simply replace each other seriatim. Someone who perceives structured objects with variegated properties does not cease to have sensuous presentations; someone who experiences the world as a particular instantiation of universal laws does not cease to see propertied things; and someone who becomes conscious of other consciousnesses in the world around her does not cease to experience a world of external, propertied things governed by laws. In each case, the world is enriched with new, more complex kinds of objects, and consciousness’ relation to its objects is equally enriched with new, more complex forms. Progress in these realms is cumulative, and consciousness is driven to ever more complex forms of thought to make sense of the complex world it encounters.
C. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Having just pointed out the cumulative nature of the progress in the Phenomenology, I now have to qualify those claims. Spirit itself, in the broad sense that includes nature and history, is the truth of things. Ultimately, nothing is external to spirit. Thus, in Hegel’s view, all knowledge is ultimately spirit’s self-knowledge. That spirit is complete within itself and need (and can) to relate itself to nothing other than itself, however, is not yet a fact for the phenomenological consciousness or self-consciousness. As consciousness, spirit cannot see itself as a complete totality and remains burdened by an apparent other. The phenomenological self still sees itself as set over against an other, and even when this other is its equal, their deeper unity is not yet apparent. The dialectic of self-consciousness is the overcoming of the apparent particularities that divide self-consciousness.

(i) Desire
The self-conscious self finds itself confronted with an external object that it takes to be, in fact, a nullity; self-consciousness is driven to make this object its own. ‘Here . . . desire still has no further determination than that of a drive, in so far as this drive, without being determined by a thought, is directed to an external object in which it seeks satisfaction’ (Enc §426A). Hegel portrays this as arising from the fact that self-consciousness is still also consciousness. That is, spirit at this point contains the ‘contradiction’ of having an independent object external to it (the structure of consciousness) while also being certain that it is itself the truth and related only to itself (the structure of self-consciousness). Its initial attempt to overcome this contradiction is to try to simply overcome the external object and make it its own: this is desire. Notice that these independent objects are objects of the kind appropriate to consciousness, things in the material world that submit to the activity of spirit. The paradigm case of overcoming such objects is consuming them. ‘Desire is therefore generally destructive in its satisfaction, just as it is generally self-seeking in respect of its content, and since the satisfaction has only been achieved in singleness, which is transient, it gives rise to further desires’ (Enc §428). The satisfaction of consumption is ever only temporary, constantly renewing the drive for more. To escape this endless progression of desire and satisfaction, a different object and a different relation to it must be found by self-consciousness: another self-consciousness, self or ‘I’.

(ii) Recognitive self-consciousness
Self-consciousness (still not yet made fully explicit) is prepared to encounter another self-consciousness: ‘Within the other as “I”, I have not only an immediate intuition of myself, but also of the immediacy of a determinate being which as “I” is for me an absolutely opposed and independently distinct object’ (Enc §430; Petry translation adapted). I intuit myself in the other insofar as I recognize that the other is the same as ‘I’, a self-consciousness. We are, Hegel says, ‘a single light’. Nevertheless, he claims that this view contradicts the equally apparent fact that this other is opposed to and independent of me. ‘Through this contradiction, self-consciousness acquires the drive to display itself as a free self, and to be there as such for the other. This is the process of recognition’ (ibid.). But the process of recognition is, Hegel tells us, a struggle. These two self-consciousnesses are, in their immediacy, distinct from and impenetrable to each other. This immediacy is represented principally in the fact that they
are spatio-temporally distinct living bodies beset with contingencies: different talents, dispositions, and abilities, different appetites or desires, etc. These consciousnesses initially relate to each other via their distinct bodies but possess a drive to find the sameness, the common identity they implicitly recognize. In order to do this, they need to overcome their immediate differences and negate their natural, organic existence. They need to show each other that they are free beings, not merely the pawns of their natural existences (nor are they ready to be the pawn of the other consciousness). This dialectic takes the form of a struggle between these two consciousnesses: ‘Each self-consciousness imperils not only the life of the other but also itself. It merely imperils itself however, for each is equally committed to the preservation of its life, in that this constitutes the existence of its freedom’ (Enc §432). The death of one of the antagonists in a struggle for recognition yields no progress, no movement towards a more satisfactory resolution of the ‘contradiction’ driving these interactions. If one of the antagonists yields in the struggle, however, a new dynamic is set up: the relationship of mastery and servitude. The forces at work here – the struggle for recognition and the eventual dominance of one party over another – Hegel tells us, account for the beginning of states and governments. But the idea that states began among humans in a violent struggle for recognition does not mean that states are legitimated by this violence. The legitimation of the state, as Hegel shows in Objective Spirit, lies elsewhere. Even so, Hegel insists that the struggle for recognition can occur only in a state of nature, where there is no government. For, in his view, the institution of the state – even a faulty, tyrannical state – already embodies the recognition of the citizens. The existence of a state preempts any crude form of the struggle for recognition.

In a famous turn-about, it is the servant who provides the key to further progress towards the fulfilment of self-consciousness. The master ‘is involved in his self-seeking, sees in the servant only his own immediate will, and is only recognized in a formal manner by a consciousness lacking in freedom’ (Enc §435A). The master has not truly met his equal in the servant; he has not found himself in his other. But the servant cannot be self-centred, ‘his desire acquires the breadth of not being confined to himself, but of also including that of another. It is thus that he raises himself above the selfish singularity of his natural will’ (ibid.).

This subduing of the servant’s self-seeking constitutes the beginning of the true freedom of man. The quaking of the singularity of the will, the feeling of the nullity of self-seeking, the habit of obedience, – this constitutes a necessary moment in the education of everyone. (Enc §435A)

The master remains in thrall to his own natural impulses; the servant learns to control his. This is the beginning of human freedom. The servant controls his natural impulses, at this point, only for the sake of the single, contingent will of the master, not yet for the sake of a truly universal rational will; but the ability to subordinate oneself to another will is an essential part of full recognition. This is a lesson the master must also somehow learn. This lesson, once learned, makes possible the transition to universal self-consciousness. 7

(iii) Universal self-consciousness
In universal self-consciousness, the contingent peculiarities of distinct individuals are not lost altogether, but they are subordinated to
SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT

the mutual recognition of the individuals. In this form of self-consciousness, the freedom and fundamental equality of all humans has become explicit. ‘This form of consciousness constitutes not only the substance of all the essential spirituality of the family, the native country, the state, but also of all virtues – of love, friendship, valour, honour, fame’ (Enc §436R). Our social lives in general rest on universal self-consciousness; mutual recognition of a shared and common nature provides the ground for the co-operation and co-ordination without which humans could not long live. It is, unfortunately, only imperfectly realized in far too many societies; bigotry and other forms of the denial of the universality of freedom and equality among persons remain a persistent and recalcitrant fact of human life.

Self-consciousness has found itself in its other. It has come to see that the fundamental structures of the objects it has found outside it are, in fact, the same as its own fundamental structures. Hegel means this literally: the forms of organization that subjective spirit, in its drive to make sense of itself, has imposed upon the sensory material with which the Phenomenology originally began have been the same forms of organization that are present everywhere in nature and in consciousness itself. Thus the subjective and particular has been unified with the objective and universal. This unity Hegel calls reason.

D. REASON

Hegel’s treatment of reason in the Encyclopaedia Phenomenology is a mere two paragraphs. He re-emphasizes the identity of the subjective and the objective.

As the certainty that its determinations are not only its own thoughts, but to the same extent generally objective, determinations of the essence of things, self-consciousness constitutes reason, which as this identity, is not only the absolute substance, but truth as knowledge. (Enc §439)

While Kant insisted that the categories do not (and could not) apply to things as they are in themselves, Hegel proposes a more powerful interpretation of reason. In his view, the fundamental nature of the world is determined by the fact that it is the self-actualization of spirit. The structural principles that we use to organize the phenomenal world of our sensory experience, and which constitute ourselves as finite, subjective spirits, are ultimately identical with the structural principles that are embodied in the natural and the intersubjectively social worlds, the principles by which infinite spirit actualizes itself. Our finitude, the fact that we are each a subjective spirit, does not cut us off from the world; it means only that we are imperfect and incomplete actualizations of spirit.

This view enables us to see ourselves once again as embodied in and continuous with the natural world; it enables us to investigate our own activities and powers: this is carried out in the Psychology.

3. THE PSYCHOLOGY

The Psychology occupies 41 paragraphs (Enc §§440–81), significantly more than either the Anthropology or the Phenomenology of Spirit. The opening paragraphs (§§440–4) discuss the general nature of the (finite) spirit reached at this stage and the specific concerns of psychology as a discipline. They also draw the distinction between theoretical and practical spirit.
Subjective Spirit

Spirit here is still subjective in the sense that it is particularized into distinct individuals who possess the simple and immediate unity of organism and spirit that is the soul. At the same time, they also possess the complex but abstract organization of internal states that makes itself congruent with the structure of external realities, that is, they possess (self)-consciousness. Psychology aims at a non-abstract self-knowledge, knowledge of the specific modes of activity by which subjective spirit can grasp its concrete reality and realize concrete freedom therein.

Psychology is therefore concerned with the faculties or general modes of the activity of spirit as such, — intuiting, representing, recollecting etc., desires etc. . . . The content, which is raised into intuitions, consists of its sensations, just as its intuitions are changed into representations, and representations immediately into thoughts etc. (Enc §440R; Petry translation adapted)

Hegel rejects the notion that the distinction between theoretical and practical spirit can be understood in terms of passivity and activity. Spirit is always active. Theoretical spirit can appear passive, because it takes up what is present or existent, while practical spirit has to produce something that is not already existent. But, Hegel points out, there is a tremendous amount of activity involved in rationally understanding something, and conversely always something passive involved in the constitution of our desires and drives. Perhaps we are, then, better off distinguishing theoretical from practical spirit, not by level of activity but in terms of whether the object is supposed to determine the subjective state or the subjective state is supposed to determine (or create) the object.

A. Theoretical Spirit

We cannot separate theoretical and practical spirit absolutely; they are necessarily related. Neither of them is ‘a fixed existence, separate from the other, as if volition could be devoid of intelligence or the activity of intelligence could be devoid of will’ (Enc §445R). Neither should we take the various ‘faculties’ or ‘powers’ (we could as well speak of ‘capacities’) that analysis attributes to theoretical spirit to be discrete existences, nor should we take theoretical spirit to be a mechanical aggregation of independent parts. These faculties – intuition, recollection, imagination, etc. – are moments in theoretical spirit, ‘the activities having no other immanent significance; their only purpose being the concept of cognition’ (ibid.).

To an extent, the dialectic of theoretical spirit replicates the dialectic we witnessed in the phenomenology, beginning from the sensory and rising once again to reason. But in the phenomenology, the development occurs via changes in the apparent object of consciousness. In theoretical spirit, it is spirit itself that develops. It understands ever better its own nature, a fact that enables it to have an increasingly rational grasp of the world around it. Hegel distinguishes between knowledge (Wissen) and cognition (Erkenntnis):

Cognition must certainly be distinguished from mere knowledge, for even consciousness is already knowledge. Free spirit is not content with simple knowledge however, for it wants to cognize, that is to say to know not merely that an object is and what it is in general as well as in respect of its contingent and external determinations, but to know what it is that constitutes the determinate substantiality of the nature of this general object. (Enc §445A; Petry translation adapted)
The phenomenological spirit, for all it knows, just happens to have the right ways to engage the objects it encounters. Theoretical spirit develops the ability to aim at and to cultivate – on purpose! – a thoroughly rationalized, self-reflective conceptual or theoretical framework for dealing with the world. Theoretical spirit aims to comprehend the world, no intellectual holds barred.

(i) Intuition

We begin at a familiar place, though in a new key. Theoretical spirit begins with immediacy: sensation and feeling. ‘Now, in the third and final instance, feeling has the significance of being the initial form assumed by spirit as such, which constitutes the unity and truth of the soul and of consciousness’ (Enc §446A). As Hegel insisted in our previous encounters with the sensory, everything is present in sensation and feeling.

Cultivated, true sensation is the sensation of a cultured spirit which has acquired consciousness of specific differences, essential relationships, true determinations etc., and it is into the feeling of such a spirit that this adjusted material enters, i.e., acquires this form. Feeling is the immediate, also the readiest form, in which the subject relates itself to a given content. (Enc §447R; Petry translation adapted)

Cultivated feelings are crucial to the good human life, but the form of feeling, mired in immediacy and open as it is to good content and bad, does not live up to the thoroughly rational ideal of theoretical spirit. Further development is called for.

The simple immediacy of intuition is broken in the next stage. On the one hand, attentive spirit now takes responsibility for distinguishing its object from everything else; on the other hand, spirit, in grasping its object not only as external but as self-external, projects it into the forms of space and time. I mentioned earlier that Hegel changed his mind between 1807 and the period of the encyclopaedic system about just when spatio-temporality appears in spirit’s objects – and in 1817 this even happens one stage later, in ‘Representation’ (Enc 1817 §373). My guess is that space and time show up only here because Hegel thinks of them as precise and quantifiable, even metrical. Spatio-temporal determinations can be elaborated in endlessly precise ways and related to each other with mathematical precision. They are the rational elaboration of self-externality, so they make their appearance within subjective spirit only in its final, rational stage, even if they appear as immediate determinacies. These moments are brought back together in intuition proper:

Intuition . . . is a consciousness which is filled with the certainty of reason, its general object having the determination of being a rationality [ein Vernünftiges], and so of constituting not a single being torn apart into various aspects, but a totality, a connected profusion of determinations. (Enc §449A)

Intuition promises insight into the substance and unity of things, their rational connectedness. Even so, the form of intuition must be superseded if spirit is to achieve a fully explicit comprehension of things.

In intuition, spirit is still very much focused on the object it grasps, but a simple turn of attention introduces a new dialectic.

Spirit . . . posits intuition as its own, pervades it, makes something inward of it, recollects [erinnert] itself within it, becomes present to itself within it, and
so becomes free. By thus passing into itself, intelligence raises itself to the stage of representation. (Enc §450A; Petry translation adapted)

(ii) Representation
Hegel develops the dialectic of representation more thoroughly than any of the other concepts in the PSS. Whereas most other parts of the text go three layers deep (e.g. I. Anthropology / A. The Natural Soul / 1. Natural Qualities), and the other parts of theoretical spirit go four layers deep (e.g. I. Psychology / A. Theoretical Spirit / 2. Representation / a. Recollection / i. The Image). This shows the importance Hegel placed on these concepts and the care with which he thought about the issues. The following overview account cannot follow the dialectic in all its detail.

In representation there is still always some sensory aspect, though its significance diminishes in the course of representation's development. Intuitions, considered not as transparent revelations of the world, but rather as subjective states whose semantic relation to the world is open to question, are also representations. Representations are mental states that do not purport to be transparent revelations of the immediately present. The three stages of representation are (a) recollection (Erinnerung), (b) imagination (Einbildungskraft) and (c) memory (Gedächtniß).

(a) Recollection. In intuition, the sensory presentation is taken as transparent revelation of the disposition of things here and now – arguably, indeed, as identical to that disposition. In recollection, the sensory presentation is isolated, abstracted from that context and freely available to spirit – Hegel calls this an image (Bild). ‘This image no longer has the complete determinacy of intuition, and is arbitrary or contingent, being generally isolated from the external place, time and immediate context in which intuition was involved’ (Enc §452). Images are somehow stored in spirit, unconscious in some ‘night-like abyss’ but available for recall on the right cue (and not necessarily available for conscious recall). Hegel denies that ‘particular representations are preserved in particular fibres and localities’ (Enc §453R; Petry translation adapted). (One thinks of modern claims that brains use non-local, distributed representations.)

Such abstract images acquire a fully determinate being, however, only when they are brought into relation to an intuition, which puts them then in indirect relation to the world itself. Such images are, like Hume’s ideas, a constant flow within us, enriching our current experience with echoes of the past. ‘The more cultured the person the less he lives in immediate intuition, in that in all his intuitions he lives at the same time in recollections’ (Enc §454A).

(b) Imagination. In imagination, spirit gains increasing power over its representations. The representations present to spirit are no longer simply evoked by external circumstances, but begin to express spirit’s own content. Furthermore, spirit is able increasingly to analyse and synthesize these representations, to pull them apart and put them together in new ways.

Hegel’s descriptions of the imaginative power of spirit are reminiscent of those of Hume and Hartley, but he criticizes thinkers who rely on the notion of the association of ideas to explain the shape of our mental lives. The supposed laws of association are no laws at all and do not, in fact, determine any particular course of mental events.
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Representations, as Hegel conceives them, already have the form of universality about them. They are abstract, without fixed relation to individuals in space and time. They are not atomistically determinate beings in their own rights, but draw their significance from their role within spirit’s individuality. So Hegel does not think that it is a problem that particular representations can have general significance, something that bothered the British empiricists.

Intelligence is increasingly able to express itself ever better in its representations, first via symbolic representations and then in signs. Hegel calls this capacity ‘phantasy’. Symbols share some characteristic of the thing symbolized, as when the eagle symbolizes courage; but signs are arbitrary. In these developments spirit comes to be able to give itself a determinate and concrete expression and therefore existence. This ability to give its own content – itself – determinate expression free from ties to the immediate environment is for spirit an important step towards absolute freedom. The most important product of sign-making imagination is clearly language, about which Hegel has a great deal to say. Language is a multi-layer affair, in Hegel’s view:

If language had to be handled in a concrete manner, the anthropological or rather the psycho-physiological (§401) standpoint would have to be referred back to for its lexical material, while the standpoint of the understanding would have to anticipated for its form or grammar. (Enc §459R)

Effectively, then, Hegel thinks that while the materials and the formal framework for language are provided by earlier stages of subjective spirit, it is only in the productive imagination that spirit has sufficiently loosened the hold of immediacy on itself to be able to use linguistic signs in a creative and self-expressive fashion.

(c) Memory. Recollection and imagination are a process of gaining greater control over the intuitive material, of subordinating what is present in intuition to spirit’s own purposes. This process is repeated again at a higher level in memory, where it is performed on those intuitions that are signs, particularly linguistic signs. Given our ordinary uses of the terms, ‘memory’ does not seem much different from ‘recollection’, but Hegel is playing here on the fact that the German word for memory, ‘Gedächtniß’, shares the same root as the word for ‘think’ (Enc §464R). Language is the form most suited to the expression of thought, so memory is primarily concerned with language.

The name lion enables us to dispense with both the intuition of such an animal and even with the image of it, for in that we understand it, the name is the imageless and simple representation. We think in names... . Memory is however no longer concerned with the image, drawn as this is from intuition, from the immediate unspiritual determinedness of intelligence, but with a determinate being which is the product of intelligence itself... (Enc §462R; Petry translation adapted)

Memory therefore represents another important step in spirit’s climb out of its immersion in the sensory towards its freedom, in its ability to determine and express its own content. In language, thought acquires a determinate and objective being – which is essential to its reality. Hegel is also dismissive of the notions that being tied to language is a defect of thought and that truth is somehow ineffable.
But memory is also puzzling. Its final stage is what Hegel calls ‘mechanical memory’, in which all that is present to spirit is a series of meaningless words. Spirit here ‘posits itself as being, the universal space of names as such, i.e., as senseless words’ (Enc §463). Hegel thinks that it is significant that we can learn things by rote, but it is difficult for us to see just what this significance is. A parallel with an earlier stage of spirit offers itself. At the end of the Anthropology the abstract ‘I’, empty of all particular content, was opposed to the sensory material encapsulated in the soul but now ejected from and opposed to the ‘I’. This provided the point of transition to the Phenomenology, during the course of which the ‘I’ recovers its content by discovering itself in the world. I suggest that the mechanical memory marks a similar point in spirit’s progress. The material content available here, language, is in principle distinguishable from thought itself. Thought does not occur in any particular language, but is rather expressed in language. The possibility of rote learning emphasizes the distinction between the pure internality of thought and the externalized internality that is language.

Intelligence purifies itself of the limitedness within it; with the meaning, the signs and the sequences also become a matter of indifference, . . . This constitutes the transition to thought, the being of this purity of intelligence, which has divested itself of images, of determinate presentations, and at the same time posited pure indeterminate self-identity as being. (Enc §464A)

(iii) Thought. After all this preparation, spirit is finally ready to think in the full-fledged sense of the term: ‘We are always thinkers, but we only fully know ourselves as such when we have raised ourselves to pure thought. Pure thought recognizes that it alone, and neither sensation nor representation, is able to grasp the truth of things’ (Enc §465A; Petry translation adapted).

Pure thought is not incompatible with, but rather builds upon representation, intuition and soul. There are three stages of thought: understanding, judgement and comprehending or syllogizing reason. Understanding (note that this term is also used to name a stage in the Phenomenology) is essentially classificatory, subsuming the singular under categories. Judgement is always thought of by Hegel as involving essential relations – both connections and differences count – among categories. In the final stage of comprehending, the necessary ties between the singular, the particular and the true universal come into focus. Comprehending reason grasps not only the full structure of the universal, but also why it particularizes itself the way it does. In pure thought, thought is its own object; it is both form and content. Spirit is ready, at this point, to think out the science of logic where, in fact, these matters are spelled out in much greater detail.

B. Practical Spirit

The practical spirit under discussion in these paragraphs is subjective, still concerned with the internality of the individual. Nonetheless, it can be made sense of only in the light of the objective reality of spirit, which is a life of freedom in a rational society. Furthermore, although this section on practical spirit follows the section on theoretical spirit, we have to think the developments of theoretical and practical spirit as coordinated and simultaneous. In coming to see how well it has come to fit the world, theoretical spirit in turn discovers how well the world has come to fit it. In its general shape, practical spirit
recapitulates themes we have encountered previously, moving from something apparently immediately given in spirit, through the diremption of that immediacy into a manifold, and finally finding a higher unity. The level of Practical Spirit, however, is higher because it is informed with thought.

(i) Practical feeling. Practical feeling is similar to feeling as we have encountered it before: it presents itself as immediately singular with a ‘natural, contingent and subjective content’ (Enc §471). Practical feeling includes moral emotions, inclinations such as benevolence, and, as we have seen with earlier levels of feeling, is crucial to living an engaged existence in which one’s rationality pervades one’s whole being. But the form of practical feeling, immediacy, does not force a rational content upon practical feeling. So practical feeling ‘can also be onesided, inessential, bad’ (Enc §471R). Bad practical feelings often get the most attention, because the good ones have a content that more properly ‘does not constitute feelings, but rights and duties, the self-determinations of spirit in their universality and necessity’ (ibid.).

Most important here is that in practical feeling there are two moments: the immediate determinacy of feeling, which seems to come from without, and the determinacy that is posited by spirit as that which ought to be. Agreement between these two moments is pleasant; disagreement unpleasant. Indeed, there are different kinds of pleasure and displeasure (e.g. joy, contentment, remorse), depending on just how the given condition agrees or disagrees with the ought posited by spirit.

(ii) Drives and wilfulness. We have, of course, many drives and inclinations, and it would be impossible to satisfy them all. Which of our drives and inclinations, then, do we pursue? Sometimes, in some people, a particular drive comes to dominate all the others: this is a passion. There may be many different subjective and contingent ways to resolve the conflicts among our drives and inclinations, each of which demands our attention and response, but not all of which can be fulfilled. ‘The immanent reflection of spirit itself is however to overcome their particularity as well as their natural immediacy, and to endow their content with rationality and objectivity, within which they have being as necessary relationships, rights and duties’ (Enc §474R). This ‘reflection’ of spirit begins here in subjective practical spirit as the will distinguishing ‘itself from the particularity of the drives, and plac[ing] itself above their multiple content as the simple subjectivity of thought’ (Enc §476; Petry translation adapted). This process culminates, however, in objective spirit. In this abstraction from the immediacy of its drives, subjective spirit begins to gain the ability to choose among its drives and inclinations, to exercise a reflective judgement over its activities. This Hegel calls ‘willfulness’ (Willkür). At this level subjective spirit is still a welter of disparate drives and inclinations, over which it tries to exert some control and into which it attempts to introduce some overall coherence. Achieving such coherence is happiness.

(iii) Happiness. Happiness is an ideal in which a coherent balance among one’s drives has been achieved, sacrificing some wholly or in part for the sake of others. But happiness is not a form of objective unity in practical spirit: ‘since happiness has affirmative content only in drives, it is they that arbitrate, and subjective feeling and whim which have to decide where happiness is to be posited’ (Enc §479). Though happiness is an ideal, an ought-to-be, it can still take on subjective and contingent shapes, depending on one’s given nature. But both the particularity
of our drives and the abstract singularity of wilfulness ‘have their truth in the universal determinacy of the will in itself, i.e., in its very self-determining, in freedom’ (Enc §480; Petry translation adapted).

C. FREE SPIRIT

Free spirit is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit: spirit that knows itself as free, as at home in the world. It recognizes its immediate and particular determinations but subordinates them to its own universal essence, thus pursuing its essential purpose, the full actualization of freedom itself. Thus, spirit now moves on to Objective Spirit, which imprints its rational essence on the world around it. The full idea of freedom is, Hegel thinks, a relatively late human acquisition. The ancient world and the orient never grasped this idea, but Christianity introduced it and it comes to fruition in modern society.

[The] relationships [of family, civil society, and state] are formed by means of [the divine] spirit and constituted in accordance with it. Through that existence the character of ethical life infuses the individual, who then, in this sphere of particular existence, of present sensations and volitions, becomes actually free. (Enc §482; my translation)

4. CONCLUSION

In the PSS, phenomena concerning individual human organisms that appear originally natural but become increasingly complex and distant from animal immediacy are interpreted in terms of their contribution to the development of individuals capable of participating in and contributing to a culturally rich, historically developed, ethically structured, free society. How the interactions of these developed individuals play out in the intersubjective arena of the social world is examined in the Philosophy of Objective Spirit.

NOTES

1 How deep the ontological divide goes was open to debate: Descartes thought the distinction was between two fundamentally different kinds of substances, Spinoza located it at the level of the basic attributes of the one substance he recognized. The empiricists, who had trouble with the notion of substance generally, still treated the mind/body distinction as exhaustive and of the greatest significance, even when one of the two was treated as ultimately illusory.

2 Hume’s attempt to replace the normative rules of reason with natural laws of association leads him into a sceptical cul-de-sac.

3 ‘Animal magnetism’ was brought to popular attention in the late eighteenth century by the Austrian physician Franz Anton Mesmer. The hypnotic state was originally thought to be related to sleep and was thus also called ‘somnambulism’ (a mistake also responsible for the word ‘hypnotism’).

4 The loci classici of both versions of externalism are, respectively, Burge (1979, pp. 73–121) and Clark and Chalmers (1998).

5 This unfinished manuscript is translated in Petry (1978, vol. 1). The passage quoted is on page 123.

6 The word translated as ‘ego’ by most English translators, one should remember, is simply the first person singular pronoun ich.

7 The stages of Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness, which appear in PhG, are not mentioned in Enc.

8 The notion of ‘moment’ here is derived from physics, in which motion is treated as a vector quantity analysable into distinct ‘moments’, each parallel to one of the spatial axes, even though there is no ‘causal reality’ to the vectors associated with the different moments of force.
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9 Petry translates Vorstellung as ‘presentation’. However, following most translators of Hegel and Kant, I use ‘representation’.

10 Both Petry and Wallace/Miller translate Triebe as ‘impulses’. But we tend to think of impulses as temporally unique events, while Hegel clearly thinks of Triebe as informing a whole series of acts: ‘Trieb . . . is a form of volitional intelligence [and] goes forth from the sublated opposition of what is subjective and what is objective, and as it embraces a series of satisfactions, is something of a whole, a universal’ (Enc §473A). This is why I prefer ‘drive’.