deVries WA. “Hegelian Spirits in Sellarsian Bottles” . Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition [Internet]. 2017;174 (7) :1643-1654. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Though Wilfrid Sellars portrayed himself as a latter-day Kantian, I argue here that he was at least as much a Hegelian.  Several themes Sellars shares with Hegel are investigated: the sociality and normativity of the intentional, categorial change, the rejection of the given, and especially their denial of an unknowable thing-in-itself.  They are also united by an emphasis on the unity of things–the belief that things do “hang together.”  Hegel’s unity is idealist; Sellars’ is physicalist; the differences are substantial, but so are the resonances.

deVries WA. “Hegel’s Revival in Analytic Philosophy” . In: The Oxford Handbook of Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press ; 2017. pp. 743-766.Abstract

Analytic philosophy is rediscovering Hegel.  This essay examines a particularly strong thread of new analytic Hegelianism, sometimes called ‘Pittsburgh Hegelianism’, which began with the work of Wilfrid Sellars.  In trying to bring Anglo-American philosophy from its empiricist phase into a more sophisticated, corrected Kantianism, Sellars moved in substantially Hegelian directions.  Sellars’ work has been extended, and revised by his Pittsburgh colleagues John McDowell and Robert B. Brandom.  The sociality and historicity of reason, the proper treatment of space and time, conceptual holism, inferentialism, the reality of conceptual structure, the structure of experience, and the nature of normativity are the central concerns of Pittsburgh Hegelianism.

deVries WA. The Causal Articulation of Practical Reality . In: Sellars and Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Routledge ; 2017. the_causal_articulation_of_practical_reality.pdf
deVries WA. Subjective Spirit: Soul, Consciousness,Intelligence and Will . In: The Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel. London: Bloomsbury ; 2013. pp. 133-156. subjective.pdf
deVries WA. All in the Family . In: Millikan and Her Critics. Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell ; 2013. pp. 261-275. all_in_the_family_final_state.pdf
deVries WA. Ontology and the Completeness of Sellars’s Two Images . Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies [Internet]. 2012;21. Publisher's Version
deVries WA. Sellars vs. McDowell on the Structure of Sensory Consciousness . Diametros [Internet]. 2011;(27). Publisher's VersionAbstract

I argue that John McDowell’s attempt to refute Wilfrid Sellars’s two-component analysis of perceptual experience and substitute for it a conception according to which perceptual experience is the “conceptual shaping of sensory consciousness” fails. McDowell does not recognize the subtle dialectic in Sellars’s thought between transcendental and empirical considerations in favor of a substantive conception of sense impressions, and McDowell’s own proposal seems to empty the notion of sensory consciousness of any real significance.

deVries WA. Some Forms of Trust . Information [Internet]. 2011;2 (1) :1-16. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Three forms of trust: topic-focused trust, general trust, and personal trust are distinguished. Personal trust is argued to be the most fundamental form of trust, deeply connected with the construction of one’s self. Information technology has posed new problems for us in assessing and developing appropriate forms of the trust that is central to our personhood.

deVries WA. Brandom and the Spirit of Hegel . In: Robert Brandoms expressive Vernunft. Paderborn: Mentis ; 2011. pp. 159-174. brandom_and_the_spirit_of_hegel.pdf
deVries WA. Kant, Rosenberg, and the Mirror of Philosophy . In: Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing ; 2010. pp. 17-27. kant_and_rosenberg.pdf
deVries WA. Empiricism,Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity and Realism: Essays on the Anniversary of“Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” . International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 2010;18 (3) :395-413.Abstract

Sellars was committed to the irreducibility of the semantic, the intentional,
and the normative. Nevertheless, he was also committed to naturalism, which is prima
facie at odds with his other theses. This paper argues that Sellars maintained his
naturalism by being linguistically pluralistic but ontologically monistic. There are
irreducibly distinct forms of discourse, because there is an array of distinguishable
functions that language and thought perform, but we are not ontologically committed
to the array of apparently non‐natural entities or relations mentioned in the
metalanguage. However, there is an underlying relation between language and world
presupposed by all empirically meaningful language. In his early work Sellars sought
to describe this relation in linguistic terms as a form of “pure description,” but
inadequacies in that notion drove him towards the naturalistic relation between
language and world that he came to call “picturing.”

deVries WA, Coates P. Brandom’s Two-Ply Error . In: Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity and Realism: Essays on the Anniversary of “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Oxford: Oxford University Press ; 2009. pp. 131-145. epm_proceedings_ch_5_devries_and_coates.doc
deVries WA. Getting Beyond Idealisms . In: Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity and Realism: Essays on the Anniversary of "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,". Oxford: Oxford University Press ; 2009. pp. 211-245. getting_beyond_idealisms.pdf
deVries WA. Sense-Certainty and the ‘This-Such’ . In: Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ; 2008. pp. 63-75. sense_certainty_and_the_this-such_published.pdf
deVries WA, Triplett T. Does Observational Knowledge Require Metaknowledge? A Dialogue onSellars . International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 2007;15 (1) :23-51. does_observational_knowledge_require_metaknowledge.pdf
deVries WA. McDowell, Sellars, and Sense Impressions . European Journal of Philosophy. 2006;14 (2) :182-201. mcdowell_sellars_and_sense_impressions.pdf